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Society for International Development, Netherlands’ Chapter (SID NL; 
www.sid-nl.org) is one of the 45 local and national chapters of SID Inter-
national, which is an international non-governmental association of 
individuals and organisation founded in 1957 to promote social justice 
and foster democratic participation (see www.sidint.org). SID NL is an 
independent platform organisation that aims to contribute to a sustai-
nable and peaceful world through stimulating, renewing and broade-
ning debates on the international cooperation in the Netherlands, 
thereby subsequently influencing policy discussions. The philosophy of 
SID NL is that development and social change can only occur if multi-
disciplinary, multi-takeholder and multi-track approach is applied. SID 
NL is one of a few organisations in the Netherlands which applies this 
approach by creating strategic partnerships with other relevant initia-
tives and organisations. Over last 20 years, SID NL has organized the 
most prestigious annual series of public lectures about development 
issues in the Netherlands, attracting top international speakers and 
audiences comprising the Dutch development intellectual elite.
 
World Population Foundation (WPF; www.wpf.org) is the only Dutch 
NGO that focuses exclusively on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights 
(SRHR) in developing countries. It has a 20-year track record of succes-
sful advocacy – pushing the Netherlands to become a leader in this field 
– and a programme of interventions in Africa and Asia. Its main specia-
lity is sexuality education, building on the experience and credibility of 
the Netherlands in SRHR matters. It has developed effective coopera-
tion with major Dutch development NGO’s. Through its MYBODY label 
(with slogan: My Life, My Choice, My Body), it enhances the awareness 
of Dutch society in general for the importance of SRHR worldwide. An 
explicit part of its mission is to explain the intricate relationship 
between population issues and SRHR.
 
The Institute of Social Studies (ISS; www.iss.nl) in The Hague is one of 
the foremost centres of teaching and research in development studies 
in Europe and the world. Established in 1952, it brings together 
students and teachers from the Global South and the North in a Euro-
pean environment, carrying out research, teaching and public service in 
the field of development studies and international cooperation. In July 
2009, ISS integrated with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam but 
remained in the Hague as an autonomous university institute.
Dr Andrew Martin Fischer is Senior Lecturer of Population and Social 
Policy at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. Heis the current convenor of the Poverty Studies 
specialisation at ISS and teaches on population, poverty and theories of 
economic development. A development economist by training and an 
interdisciplinary social scientist by conviction, he has been involved in 
studying, researching or working in development studies or in developing 
countries for over 20 years, including extensive experience in Central 
America in the late 1980s, seven years working with refugees and local 
NGOs in Northern India and Nepal from 1995 to 2001, and almost two 
years of PhD and post-PhD field research in western China. His research 
generally deals with marginalised and/or disadvantaged peoples, focu-
sing on how poverty and inequality are affected by patterns of population 
change, economic growth, social policy, aid, trade and finance. He 
earned a PhD in Development Studies from the London School of Econo-
mics, where he researched China’s economic development strategies in 
the Tibetan areas of Western China from the early 1990s onwards. The 
results of this research were published in State Growth and Social Exclu-
sion in Tibet: challenges of recent economic growth (NIAS Press, 2005), 
and in Population and Development Review and other journals. During 
this time, he had the fortune to study and teach demography and popula-
tion studies with Professor Tim Dyson (one of the speakers of this series) 
and to receive the supervision of Professor Athar Hussain, a leading 
scholar of China based at LSE. He earned his BA and MA in Economics 
from McGill University in Montreal, Canada.  
This lecture series is made possible due to the financial
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1. Introduction: The Need for a Debate 
 
In 2009, a line up of leading international experts on the subject of population and 
development were brought to The Hague for a series of six lectures, held at the 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS)2 of Erasmus University Rotterdam. The lectures were 
co-organised by the Dutch chapter of the Society for International Development 
(SID),3 the World Population Foundation (WPF),4 and the ISS. The principle speakers 
invited from abroad were also joined by leading experts from the Netherlands, who 
provided comments and discussion. Each session privileged questions and debate 
from the audience, in all cases attended by a wide range of participants from Dutch 
academic and policy making circles and averaging around 100 people per lecture. 
Those attending included students and academic staff from various universities and 
research institutes,5 policy makers and civil servants, various Dutch media, and 
representatives from embassies in The Hague, international organisations, NGOs, 
and the business community.6 Two lectures in particular were reported in the NRC 
Handelsblad, the leading Dutch newspaper, one of which set off a debate between 
Tim Dyson, the first speaker, and a Dutch demographer.7  
 The success of this event bore evidence of the public interest in the important 
subject of population and development. Indeed, the purpose of the lecture series, as 
conceived by SID, WPF and ISS, was to revive attention to issues of population 
policy, bringing them back into public debate in Netherlands. The timing was 
especially pertinent; 15 years had passed since the famous Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, which had placed 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) firmly onto the international 
agenda. Meanwhile, the upcoming climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 
was bringing much attention to population issues, albeit not always in an accurate or 
constructive manner. In the Netherlands, a seminal review of Dutch international 
development assistance was in progress, conducted by the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR) and resulting in the now much-debated report that the 
WRR presented to the government in January 2010.8  
 Hence, there was a pressing need to stimulate an informed debate on 
population and development as a means to influence policy deliberations as they 
were happening and in a manner that would advance a rights-based and 
scientifically-informed approach to population policy. This need was also laden with 
responsibility given that the Netherlands has been considered an international leader 
in the field of SRHRs, both in advocacy and in funding. For instance, the Netherlands 
is the largest funder of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and SRHRs 
and HIV/AIDS were named as priorities of Dutch policy in the government’s policy 
paper on development cooperation for 2007-2011.9 Yet, despite this role, debate about 
population issues had been non-existent in the Netherlands and almost taboo in 
certain Dutch circles. It is precisely for this reason that SID, WPF and ISS decided to 
join hands in order to re-open the debate after a hiatus of many years. 
Of particular concern was to re-centre the commitment to SRHRs within a 
broader perspective of family planning and population policy, the latter having 
fallen into much disrepute and dispute over the past decades. It is important to 
acknowledge that family planning policies have been very sensitive in part because  
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of abuses in the past, but also in part because they deal with issues that touch upon 
the most private aspects of peoples’ lives, such as sex and sexuality, contraception, 
childbearing, family relationships, health, sickness, and even death. They also deal 
with issues that are considered by many to be the preserve of religion and culture. 
However, despite such sensitivity, the Cairo conference in 1994 managed to bring an 
unparalleled degree of consensus on population policies among national 
governments, research communities and civil society organisations. This consensus 
shifted the focus of population policies from interventions aimed exclusively at 
slowing population growth towards policies aimed at improving the lives and free 
choices of individuals and, in particular, women, as a more ethical and effective way 
of dealing with demographic issues. This was the origin of the Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) agenda, at least in terms of being codified 
into an international agreement.  
Nonetheless, tensions remain. For one, population issues are not limited to 
fertility and reproductive health. Even though thinking has moved towards 
improving the lives of individuals, there is still too often a focus in policies on only 
one aspect of population - fertility rates – which in effect limits rather than enlarges 
women’s reproductive freedom. Instead, a holistic approach to population policy 
should arguably also include, as a minimum, consideration of gender, generation, 
mortality and migration. Moreover, it should be rights-based, in terms of 
guaranteeing safe, affordable and good quality choice, made available to the whole 
population at comparable levels of quality and without discrimination, within a 
universalistic and well-funded system of public provisioning of common social 
goods, particularly in the sectors of health and education. This is in contrast to the 
increasing trend of promoting choice simply through segmented, stratified and 
marketised forms of social service provisioning, increasingly driven by financial 
means rather than by human needs.  
In relation to this last point, there has been concern that the consensus 
achieved by Cairo has possibly moved the pendulum too far in the direction of 
individual choice, at the cost of attention (and funding) to more traditional state-led 
approaches to population policy, particularly family planning programmes and in 
areas of the world still experiencing rapid population growth, such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Central Asia. Similarly, the shift of focus towards rights and HIV has 
possibly drawn attention (and funding) away from more general, broad-based, and 
multi-sectoral approaches to both population and health policy. The consequences of 
this might have been particularly detrimental to countries still dealing with 
stubbornly high levels of both fertility and mortality, and, as a result, with rapid 
population growth rates, among other considerations.  
Indeed, many of these concerns reflect the fact that the discourse of choice and 
rights, while certainly well intentioned by many, might have been usurped by a 
broadly neoliberal agenda of social policy. For instance, reports of intrusive 
violations of reproductive rights in state-run family planning programmes, most 
dramatically represented by forced sterilisations and abortions, have reinforced an 
anti-state mentality with regard to population policy more generally. This is despite 
the many important achievements that have been made by many (non-coercive) 
state-led family planning programmes. Moreover, while it is important to 
acknowledge the abuses of the past, it is also important to reaffirm the centrality of 
state leadership in most previous cases of successful (as well as unsuccessful) 
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transitions towards lower fertility and mortality. In other words, despite the 
travesties that have been perpetrated in the name of family planning, it is important 
not to throw the baby out with the bath water (no demographic pun intended).  
In addition to these concerns, it is also important to note that population 
issues are not limited to demography. Increasingly, population issues are coming 
under scrutiny in wider discussions at national and international levels. For instance, 
population is often mentioned in debates regarding to high-attention issues such as 
climate change, environmental degradation, food, water and energy scarcities, 
economic growth, security and failed states, urbanisation, and migration. Rather than 
relying on evocative caricatures, each of these issues requires an informed response 
from a scientifically-grounded population perspective.  
Among the highest profile debates in this regard have been related to both 
environmental and anti-poverty campaigns. Unfortunately, such campaigns often 
rely on simplistic ‘neo-Malthusian’ ideas of poverty-population-environment 
interactions. This is known as the ‘PPE spiral’, as once coined by UNICEF in the 1994; 
poverty induces higher fertility and higher population growth among poor people 
because children are seen as providing old age security, extra labour and income, 
and compensation for higher mortality. This places pressure on the environment and 
leads to environmental degradation, which in turn worsens poverty. Hence, the poor 
are doomed to a poverty trap due to their unregulated sexual behaviour and should 
be shown the way of fertility regulation in order to break the spiral. The argument is 
based on a simplistic statistical extrapolation that, because poor people have more 
children than rich people, worsening poverty must therefore cause higher fertility.  
Whether or not high fertility causes poverty is a different question. Both angles were 
addressed by several of the speakers in the lecture series.  
Among the reactions to such arguments, some people take an opposite 
position of arguing that overpopulation is a myth, used as a rationalisation for 
imposing political agendas, alongside questionable ethics related to birth control.  
Interestingly, The Netherlands often appears in these arguments given that it 
presents a quintessential case of relatively rapid population growth on a very small 
piece of (very wet) land, simultaneous with economic improvement over several 
centuries. However, it is simplistic to compare the historical experience of The 
Netherlands, when it was at the height of its colonial power, to the experience of 
poor countries today. Moreover, as noted in the final session of the lecture series, 
more recently the Dutch have often been criticised for the wide availability of 
abortion services made available in their country, which would seem to contradict 
the pro-natalist position. The rejection of simplistic neo-Malthusian arguments 
should not lead us to the opposite extreme of abandoning family planning 
altogether, the consequences of which might be severe in poor countries that are 
currently growing far faster than The Netherlands ever grew. Indeed, many aid-
financed family planning programmes already suffered from such a predicament 
when President George W. Bush re-imposed the Global Gag Rule on the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) population program in 2001.10 Similar set-
backs were suffered in many family planning and HIV/AIDS programmes in Africa 
from 2003 onwards when Bush cut funding for condoms and insisted that recipient 
countries of his emergency aid plan for AIDS relief must emphasise abstinence over 
condoms and must condemn prostitution. 
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Hence, while acknowledging and addressing past abuses, it is important to 
demystify family planning and to remove the bad reputation it has earned as an 
interventionist tool promoted by predominantly male decision makers to control 
women’s fertility and to limit their choice. Of course, a key step in this direction can 
be taken by firmly rooting family planning within a rights-based approach. Some 
have called this ‘family planning with a human/female face’. It involves planning of 
the family by the family and with the best interest of the family in mind, with a 
woman at the centre as an active, informed and empowered decision maker in this 
process and in her whole life. Such family planning, it is argued, should not be a tool 
of governments used to regulate the population. Rather, it must be a set of policies, 
conditions and services provided by the government and the wider society which 
serve as means to provide women and their partners with a real opportunity to 
decide on how many children they wish to have and how to space them, and also as 
prevention of unwanted pregnancies and avoidable infant and maternal mortality.  
The question, of course, is how to achieve this goal. The rights-based approach 
to family planning implies many assumptions about sexuality, fertility, reproduction 
and mortality. It also implies many assumptions about systems of social service 
provisioning, gender relations, state society relations, local and global political 
economy, and so on, all of which are rife with often highly contentious politics. 
However, the best antidote for political emotions is often known to be an academic 
lecture, in this case aimed to ground the discussion in a scientifically-informed 
debate about the core issues of population and development.  
 
1.1. The Lectures 
 
These debates and more were addressed by the six lectures, the results of which are 
summarised in this report. The lectures were designed with a multi-stakeholder and 
multi-disciplinary approach in mind. Given the theme and the venue of the lecture 
series, an obvious emphasis was on stakeholders engaged in international 
development cooperation, although certain lectures also aimed to appeal to 
environment, climate change, and migration specialists as well. In each lecture, a 
prominent international expert in the field of population and development was 
invited to present on a particular theme, followed by a reply or, in some cases, an 
additional presentation by another international or national expert in a population or 
related field. In some cases, discussants and chairs came from more policy-oriented 
circles. Each session also privileged a period of open discussions with the audience.  
The six lectures followed six sub-themes, each intended to shed light on a 
different dimension of the interrelated population issues discussed above. These 
were as follows: 
 
1. The first lecture, on 23 April 2009, introduced the series with a presentation 
entitled; ‘Global Demographic Transition: its consequences and implications 
for development’, by Tim Dyson, Professor of Population Studies at the 
Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics. The 
discussant was Dr Michel Garenne from the Pasteur Institute in Paris. The 
session was chaired by Professor Louk de la Rive Box, the Rector of ISS.  
2. The second lecture, on 14 May 2009, was on the topic of Population, Migration 
and Urbanisation, presented by Nigel Harris, Emeritus Professor of 
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Development Planning and Economics of the City, at University College 
London, UK.  The discussant was Mahmood Messkoub, Senior Lecturer in 
Development Studies at ISS. The chair was Ashwani Saith, Professor of Rural 
Economics, also at ISS.    
3. The third lecture, on 18 June 2009, was on Population and Generation, 
presented by John Cleland, Professor of Medical Demography at the Centre 
for Population Studies, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and 
also the President of the International Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population from 2006-2009. The discussant was Joris Voorhoeve, Professor of 
International Organisations at Leiden University and of International Security 
at the Netherlands Defence Academy, member of the Council of State, former 
Minister of Defence, and former Chair of WPF. The chair was Mr. Jos van 
Gennip, President of the Netherlands Chapter of SID.   
4. The fourth lecture, on 17 September 2009, was on Population and Gender, 
presented by Dr Mari Simonen, the Deputy Executive Director for External 
Relations at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The discussant 
was Dr Wendy Harcourt, Editor of the quarterly journal Development on behalf 
of SID International and a part-time Professor at the European University 
Institute. The chair was Sylvia Borren, Co-Chair of Worldconnectors and 
former CEO of Oxfam/Novib. 
5. The fifth lecture, on 22 October 2009, brought a regional focus to the series 
with a presentation on ‘Population Dynamics and it Impacts on China’s 
Development’, which included some discussion of the relationship between 
population and environment. This was presented by Professor Xizhe Peng, 
Dean of the School of Social Development and Public Policy and Director of 
the Institute of Population Research, both at Fudan University in Shanghai, 
China. The discussant was Professor Jeroen van Ginneken, Honorary Fellow 
at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demography Institute in The Hague and 
Professor of Demography at the School of Public Health, University of 
Pretoria, South Africa. The chair was Anke Niehof, Professor of Sociology at 
Wageningen University, Netherlands. 
6. The final concluding lecture, on 12 November 2009, returned to the 
overarching question; ‘Is Population Growth still an issue?’ This was 
presented by Professor Steven W. Sinding, Senior Fellow of the Guttmacher 
Institute in the USA, former Director General of the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF), former professor at Columbia University, 
former Director of the Population Sciences Program at the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and a member of the United States Delegation to the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994. The 
discussant was Albert Gerard Koenders, then the Dutch Minister for 
Development Cooperation (up until March 2010). The session was chaired by 
Jos van Gennip, President of the Netherlands Chapter of SID.  
 
Overall, there was a striking degree of consistency and consensus across all the 
presentations. This might have been due to a certain selection bias in choosing the 
presenters. However, it more generally reflects a certain degree of agreement in the 
field of population studies on the causes of population growth and, thus, on the 
common public misconceptions that urgently need to be corrected.  
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 The sense of agreement represents, to some degree, certain advances that have 
been made in the field of demography and population studies since the 1970s, when 
pessimism about the ability of poor countries and poor people to lower their fertility 
reigned in both academic and popular perception. There is now a wide recognition of 
the fact that fertility has been falling rapidly in poor countries, much more rapidly 
than in earlier European cases, and that this has been taking place largely 
irrespective of level of income. Indeed, in retrospect, this fact took many 
demographers by surprise. For instance, back in the 1970s, there was strong 
scepticism on whether China would ever be able to lower its fertility rates, even 
while China was lowering these rates at a speed never before witnessed, prior to the 
introduction of the one-child policy. Similarly, fertility declines were taking place in 
the 1970s in many other poor countries, such as Egypt, even as prominent 
demographers were debating whether it would take 15 or even 25 years before 
fertility would start to decline in these same countries. By around 2000, countries 
attaining low rates of total fertility per woman at low or fairly low levels of average 
per capita income included: China (1.8), Sri Lanka (2.0), Thailand (1.7), Indonesia 
(2.3) and Costa Rica (2.7). These insights – that poor countries and poor people can 
and do reduce their birth rates - have driven much new thinking in demography. The 
field has since moved away from older ideas rooted in a ‘modernisation theory’ 
perspective of population and development, and towards more subtle distinctions 
between processes of human development on one hand, and processes of economic 
development, hierarchy and power on the other. 
 Similar advances have been made in the realm of population policy. Obtrusive 
and coercive family planning strategies were also at their apex in the 1970s and 
1980s, often leading to violations of sexual, reproductive and other rights, and 
lending a bad name to family planning. However, many of the cases of falling 
fertility mentioned above, all of which relied on extensive use of family planning, 
avoided the abuses and violations of family planning that grabbed the headlines. 
Moreover, there has been increasing recognition, encouraged by Cairo but also 
supported by demographers, that there is no inherent contradiction between family 
planning and population policy on one hand, and rights-based approaches on the 
other. As argued by Tim Dyson, the first speaker in the series, all the evidence shows 
that – given a real choice, a little time, and an underlying condition of sustained 
reductions in mortality (particularly infant, child and maternal mortality) – women 
(even poor and illiterate women) generally choose to reduce (or at least regulate) 
their fertility. Hence, the means harmonise with the ends; choice-based approaches to 
family planning might well be the best way to bring down fertility, provided that 
they are grounded within broad-based and equitable systems of health and other 
social service provisioning.  
 Obviously, various ongoing debates still exist on specific issues of causality or 
technicality. The interconnections between population issues and wider political 
economy issues are especially contentious, including questions of distributive justice, 
particularly at the global level, social policy systems, economic and employment 
policies, gender, or climate change. Many of these points of contention were treated 
at length by the speakers in the lecture series. The following summary provides a 
synthesis of each session, highlighting the agreements, debates, contentions and 
consensuses within the series as a means to draw out the salient points that can 
potentially contribute to a scientifically-informed Dutch population policy.  
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2. Summary of the Lectures 
 
2.1.Session One: Overview on the Global Demographic Transition  
 
The first session opened with Professor Tim Dyson from the London School of 
Economics. In retrospect, Dyson’s lecture framed the themes of the whole series, in 
the sense that he endeavoured, in his characteristic manner that has brought him 
fame among generations of LSE students, to sum up the entirety of what is known as 
the demographic transition and how, in his opinion, this transition explains so much 
of what we call ‘development’. In other words, development in its most essential 
meaning is the demographic transition, insofar as development should, above all, 
imply peoples’ improved health and control over mortality. From this one remote 
cause – reduced mortality – most of what we understand as the processes underlying 
modern population dynamics unfold.  
 Despite the fact that most people know little about the demographic 
transition, Dyson described it as perhaps the most important event to occur in 
human affairs during the last 250 years, since it first started in the countries of north-
western Europe towards the end of the 18th century. It explains the unprecedented 
growth in the size of the world’s population since that time, which will probably lead 
to roughly a nine-fold increase between 1750 and 2050, at which point the global 
population is predicted to stabilise.  
 This very complex process in fact encompasses several transitions; mortality 
transition, fertility transition, epidemiological (or health) transition, and migration 
transition. Dyson explained that the sequencing of these processes always involves a 
broadly predictable pattern. First, the death rate comes down before the birth rate, 
largely due to falls in infectious and parasitic diseases (hence the epidemiological or 
health transition, leading to mortality transition). As a result, there is a long period 
when the birth rate is higher than the death rate, which in turn leads to a lengthy 
period of population growth. Population growth is reflected at the level of individual 
couples as average family size increases, mainly because fewer children are dying. 
This eventually leads to a lagged adoption of birth control, which can be regarded as 
an attempt to maintain family size rather than decrease it. Population ageing takes 
place because of falling fertility, not because of falling mortality. Finally, the birth 
rate falls until it is roughly equal to the death rate.  
 In sum, the transition involves a movement from a quasi-equilibrium of high 
and roughly equal death and birth rates, to another quasi-equilibrium of low and 
roughly equal death and birth rates. Quasi-equilibrium implies that, at both ends of 
the transition, average levels of net fertility per woman are roughly the same, at 
around replacement in both cases (i.e. parents are replaced by two surviving adult 
offspring). However, through the course of transition, reproduction becomes much 
more efficient. Before the transition, women might have six births in order for two of 
them to survive into adulthood, whereas after the transition, they can achieve the 
same result with just 2 births—both of which will generally survive. The period of 
the disequilibrium, when death rates are lower than birth rates, is the transition, 
which results in population growth and related phenomena such as population 
ageing and urbanisation. Obviously, equilibrium at the end of this transition is 
possibly a misnomer given that there is now talk of a second demographic transition, 
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as fertility and birth rates continue to fall well below replacement levels in most of 
Europe, Japan and some other parts of the world. 
 This has been described as a movement from disorder to order. Dyson 
stressed that truly ‘pre-transitional’ conditions are hard for us to even imagine. 
Perhaps 20 to 30 percent of children would have died before reaching their first 
birthday. Events like epidemics and famines were so frequent that adults could never 
be very sure that they would survive from one year to the next, while the fact that 
fertility was high meant that the population was young. Women had, on average, 
perhaps five to seven births each during the course of their reproductive lives. In 
short, life was very uncertain in pre-transitional circumstances and women’s lives 
tended to be dominated by childbearing (pregnancy, lactation, etc). In contrast, a 
post-transitional society is one much like our own. Life is much more secure—
indeed, few people die before the age of fifty and the fact that fertility is low means 
that the age structure of the population is old. Women may have a couple of births 
(or less) during the course of their reproductive lives.  
 From this perspective, Dyson argued that the demographic transition is a very 
good thing. People live much longer and life becomes much more assured. People 
can increasingly plan ahead. It makes sense for them to save and invest—for example 
in their children’s education. Indeed, many argue that modern economic growth is 
simply not possible without such changes. And the huge increase in the efficiency of 
reproduction frees up women from many of their traditional roles.  
 This transition is now complete in Europe and in a few places like Japan, but it 
is still ongoing in the rest of the world, given that it started much later. In most 
developing countries, for instance, the initial decline in mortality generally started in 
the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, the decline in death rates happened much 
quicker than previously in Europe given that developing countries had easy and 
cheap access to the advances in medical research and practice that suddenly became 
available after the Second World War. They also experienced these health and 
mortality improvements largely independently of their level of per capita income.  
 As a result, the more recent demographic transitions in developing countries 
have involved much faster population growth rates as well. In the Netherlands, 
England, and Spain, population growth rates rarely exceeded 1.5 percent per year 
(and then only briefly), while more recent transitions (e.g. those in Taiwan and 
Egypt) have often involved annual growth rates of 2.5 percent or more, frequently 
lasting over many decades. Indeed, in some world regions population growth rates 
of 3 percent per year have been common. For instance, UN estimates suggest that the 
populations of West Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa grew at about 2.5 percent per year 
between 1950 and 2010, which implies a population ‘doubling time’ of about 28 years 
 Speed of growth determines the population ‘growth multiples’, i.e. the 
number of times a population increases over the course of its transition. From start to 
end of transition, populations in Europe generally increased by factors of about two 
to three times their starting size, and emigration removed a substantial portion of 
this increase. Population in China will probably increase by about three or four 
times. India’s population may increase by roughly five or six times. In transitions 
elsewhere, growth multiples will vary from between five and twenty times, and 
sometimes even more. For instance, Dyson cited UN estimates suggesting that 
between 1950 and 2050, East Africa’s population will grow eleven times. In all of 
these latter cases, emigration accounts for a very marginal sliver of the increase. 
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 Dyson illustrated the significance of this in aggregate numbers by comparing 
Nigeria and Russia. Nigeria’s population increased from 37 to 125 million between 
1950 and 2000, and is projected to rise to 289 million by 2050. Russia’s population, 
which was in the final stages of transition between 1950 and 2000, increased from 
about 103 to 147 million, although now it is projected to shrink back to about 116 
million by 2050 because of very low fertility. Although projections should always be 
approached with caution, he noted that this broad relative picture is virtually 
inevitable.  
 In both cases, he argued that it is the pace of change involved that is 
problematic. According to his opinion, after a long period of agnosticism on the 
subject, the weight of current thinking among economists who study the issue is that 
rapid population growth has a negative impact on the pace of aggregate economic 
growth in developing countries and that rapid fertility decline contributes to 
reducing the incidence and severity of poverty. He added that, insofar as rapid urban 
growth is often seen as a problem, lowering fertility also lowers the rate of urban 
growth given that processes of urbanisation are themselves fundamentally the result 
of demographic transition rather than economic factors (as is commonly assumed).  
 While all of these points are generally well accepted in the field of population 
studies, Dyson then explained his somewhat more contentious thesis. He argued that 
even processes of democratization and the reduction of gender differentiation were 
ultimately the outcome of the demographic transition as well. In the case of 
democratization, urbanisation and population ageing result in circumstances where 
political power is eventually likely to become much more diffused in society. 
Similarly, the shift to greater gender equality over the course of the transition is 
underpinned by the fact that women gradually become less tied to concerns of the 
domestic domain with falling fertility, and their roles in society become much more 
similar to those of men. 
 On the relation between population growth and carbon emissions, Dyson 
reflected that population growth obviously exerts an upward effect on carbon 
emissions, although this effect is much bigger in rich countries because of their much 
higher levels of per capita emissions. For instance, calculations using the UN 
population projections suggest that projected population growth in South-Central 
Asia between 2000 and 2050 will raise global emissions by about 931 million tons; but 
projected population growth in North America will raise global carbon emissions by 
almost 2.5 billion tons, even though the projected population increase is far less.  
 In conclusion, Dyson repeated his conviction that the demographic transition 
has indeed been a good thing, but that it also represents a period of destabilization—
at both household and national levels – which has been considerable in some 
developing countries. The provision of safe, effective, and affordable contraception is 
the main way of minimizing this destabilization. This is because contraception 
provides people with choice and all the evidence shows that, given the possibility of 
making the choice to use contraception, women and men eventually decide to take it. 
 
 Dyson’s presentation was followed by Dr Michele Garenne, who covered 
much of the same ground, although placing more emphasis on Malthusian 
perspectives about population and development. Malthus, he argued, was writing 
his famous treatise on population at the end of the 18th century, following a long 
period of human history in which the human reproductive norm was to maximize 
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fertility in order to balance high mortality. There were some sporadic attempts to 
control fertility through abortion and infanticide, although these seem to have been 
very marginal in terms of the overall picture. Malthus did not anticipate the modern 
demographic transition, such as the sustained reduction of mortality and conscious 
attempts by families to control fertility, with a preference for smaller family sizes.  
In this sense, Garenne argued that we have now entered a new paradigm of 
human reproductive strategies. From this perspective, Malthus had been both right 
and wrong. He was right in the sense that, up to the time he wrote, population 
growth was checked by disease, famine, poverty and war. Or else, as he expounded 
in the second edition of his treatise, population was checked by what he called ‘the 
moral restraints’, meaning abstinence and delayed marriage, which were the only 
methods of fertility control that were culturally acceptable in Europe at that time. 
However, Malthus was wrong in that he did not anticipate major innovations in 
agriculture between 1800 and 2000, and he also did not anticipate that people would 
start changing behaviour by choice (i.e. use of contraception) rather than by physical 
constraint (i.e. no sex). Garenne argued that this new attitude became morally 
acceptable in the nineteen century primarily because of the secularization of societies. 
In essence, couples in Europe solved the age-old population problem by changing 
their attitude and behaviour and adopting contraception. Colonization exported this 
new attitude to the rest of the world by providing a template, which people could 
imitate after the 1950s through state policies of family planning programmes. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the constraints on population have 
disappeared; the world is still limited in space and resources.  
Garenne also reflected on the replicability of the Dutch case. The Netherlands 
is often taken to be an ideal model refuting Malthusian ideas given its combination of 
high population density with high income by increasing arable land through 
technology, efficiently managing the state and the economy, and developing trade. 
These permitted population explosion on very small amount of (very wet) land. 
There is also a political dimension; The Netherlands was a leader in liberalism, 
economic development, international trade, democracy and permissiveness. 
However, Garenne clarified that this does not mean the Dutch case is replicable. The 
Netherlands has an outstanding ecological environment, very different from the 
world average; very fertile soil, an endless supply of water, no major geographical 
obstacles (i.e. mountains or deserts). The only problem the Dutch had to deal with 
was water control, which they did with success. The same would not be possible in 
the middle of India or in the Southern parts of Africa, where there is little water. 
Nonetheless, in places with conditions similar to the Netherlands, such as the deltas 
of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers in Bengal, the Nile delta in Egypt, or the 
Niger delta in Nigeria, similar developments never happened. So, he also credited 
the Dutch with incredible innovation and techniques. Obviously, such discussions 
also need to consider the evolution of capitalism in Europe and colonialism by 
Europeans, in which the Dutch played a central military, commercial and financial 
role, although such considerations were beyond the scope of Garenne’s presentation.  
Regarding food and resource limits, Garenne pointed out that new solutions 
to these limits are primarily based on pushing these limits forward, not on resolving 
them. Hence, the limits still exist, particularly in the case of water.  The demand for 
energy is also increasing and land space is limited. He noted that land was relatively 
abundant a century ago in Africa, but this is no longer the case.   
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From this perspective, he argued that we are reaching the core of a new 
relationship between population, development and environment, in which any large 
change affects the global ecological equilibrium. This global dimension is new. Major 
issues include: global warming; land degradation and pollution; negative health 
impacts of pesticides, fertilizers, toxic waste, etc.; and the price of land, which has 
been increasing very quickly and is likely to increase more in the future. These issues 
require us to face major trade offs, which necessitate difficult choices, which in turn 
affect the global ecological equilibrium. For instance, an increase in arable land 
implies the destruction of rainforests, increases in carbon dioxide emissions, and 
global warming as well as many other related adverse consequences. Hence, if we 
consider the basic constraints of human life as mentioned above, Garenne questioned 
whether we have found any solution compatible with population increases at levels 
of income defined by a North American way of life.  
On the subject of the politics of population control, Garenne commented that 
the context was much politicised when the population debate started in the 1950s 
due to decolonisation and the Cold War. This was unfortunate for population issues 
given that now there are no longer any major conflicting interests, in the sense that 
attitudes and behaviour towards low fertility have tended to converge in recent 
years, as mentioned above. However, in a point that was supported by Dyson later in 
the discussion period, he emphasised that we have been lucky to have had dedicated 
people in USA who started to address the issue of population control in the early 
1950s. Without them, we would be in much worse situation now and world 
population would not stabilize in 2050, as according to current UN projections. We 
have also been lucky to have been able to develop modern contraceptive methods 
that are effective, safe and cheap. If developing contraceptive devices had been as 
hard as finding a vaccine for malaria or HIV, the fertility transition would have taken 
much longer, with numerous ecological consequences.  
Garenne concluded with a note of optimism regarding the future of fertility 
transition based on his extensive experience in Africa.11 He reflected that Africa 
today, like Asia fifty years ago, is undergoing a major demographic transition much 
faster than would have been anticipated when he started studying demography 
about 30 years ago, contrary to much popular perception. He explained that, when 
given the choice, couples all over the world are choosing to have fertility near or 
below replacement, regardless of circumstances and largely independent of culture 
and religion. Even the countries considered to be most conservative also have good 
family planning programmes, such Iran and Pakistan. Fertility is declining very 
quickly in virtually all urban areas of the world, and this has been happening within 
only two generations, versus the two centuries it took in Europe. This was not at all 
obvious 30 years ago. 
 
The discussion period of this session allowed both speakers to elaborate on 
several particularly interesting themes. The first was on the causes of fertility change 
and the extent to which a minimum level of per capita income is required for fertility 
decline in a population. Dyson responded to a question on this point by re-
emphasising that very poor populations can reduce their fertility, refuting the 
paradigm of 30 or 40 years ago whereby it was thought that increases in per capita 
income were required in order to reduce fertility. Experience has shown this is not 
necessarily the case. In South India, for example, fertility has declined to a very low 
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level. While rising living standards are important in their own right, Dyson believes 
(along with others such as John Cleland, the third speaker in the series) that the 
ultimate cause of fertility decline is mortality decline. No human population has 
reduced its fertility from high to low levels in the absence of a previous and 
sustained major mortality decline. Similarly, if such mortality decline happens 
among poor populations, these populations also tend to reduce their fertility, even if 
they otherwise stay poor.   
Garenne supported Dyson on this point. It has been fascinating, he reflected, 
to see that fertility has been declining almost everywhere for the last 30 years. There 
are still a few places in Africa where fertility decline has not yet started, such as rural 
Uganda, rural Congo, rural Nigeria, and Chad. However, there are a number of 
urban places in Africa where fertility has fallen to almost replacement. Nobody 
would have predicted this twenty years ago. The UN was predicting in the 1960s and 
1970s that the world population would reach 15 billion people in 2050, whereas now 
it is predicting only around 9.2 to 9.5 billion. This is because fertility decline has been 
much faster than anticipated.  
A question was asked whether this was due to the predictability of income or 
food rather than the level of income. Garenne replied that predictability is important, 
but it is about more than only food or income. It is a general question of 
predictability, the most essential aspect of which is mortality. As discussed by Dyson, 
this aspect of increased predictability is explained by disease control, especially 
vaccinations and antibiotics. With disease control, everything becomes more 
predictable. This explains the success of family planning programmes even in very 
poor countries where incomes have hardly increased. Garenne gave the example of 
Senegal, where he had been working for 10 years; there was no growth in real per 
capita income from 1950 to 2000, although fertility decline had been dramatic in 
urban areas and is now starting to decline in rural areas as well.  
The second theme in the discussion dealt with the related issue of women’s 
education and women’s rights to self determination of their body and their health. 
One woman in the audience pointed out that these issues had not been addressed in 
the lectures. This allowed for some clarification on these points by the speakers. 
Dyson specified that, absolutely, the education of women and girls is terribly 
important. He explained that a lot of demographic research over the last 30 years 
found that the level of female education tends to be the most important variable 
associated with variations in the levels of fertility and child mortality within a 
household. Demographers then came to appreciate that increasing women’s 
education is a crucial way of facilitating fertility and child mortality decline.  
However, Dyson qualified this point, reminding us that uneducated women 
can reduce their fertility as well; it just generally takes them longer. For example, 
around 60 percent of the reduction in fertility that occurred in India from 1991 and 
2001 occurred amongst women with little or no education, as shown by the late great 
Indian demographer Mari Bhat, who died in 2007. So, while education is terribly 
important and it does facilitate the adoption of family planning amongst other 
things, it is also possible for women with little or no education to reduce their 
fertility as well, if given the opportunity.  
Gareenne agreed with Dyson, offering Morocco as an additional example. 
There, half of the population is illiterate because they are living in the mountains and 
are extremely isolated, while the other half is fairly educated and living at more or 
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less European standards, yet fertility decline has been basically the same for both 
groups. Fertility has declined a bit earlier and faster for the educated women, but the 
magnitude and speed of fertility decline among the illiterate Moroccan women has 
been impressive as well. The same applies to Bangladesh and many African 
countries. He also cautioned that we should not look at female education merely for 
the purpose of limiting family size; it is important in its own right.  
The third major theme discussed pertained to climate change, particularly 
with regard to issues of North-South distributive justice and the possibility of 
reducing economic growth. Dyson offered extensive clarification and 
recommendations on this theme. To start with, carbon emissions basically result from 
modern economic growth. The whole basis of rising living standards is more or less 
entirely predicated on the use of fossil fuels; oil, coal, and natural gas. If we would 
take out the products based on fossil fuels from our regular modern consumption 
now, virtually all material products would disappear. Modern European populations 
do not recognize how dependent they are upon fossil fuels (plus nuclear power in 
the case of France), the energies of which sustain the material living standard we 
enjoy. Carbon emissions per person per year in the USA are over twenty tons per 
year. This very high level is partly because of the dispersed nature of North 
American society, but those emissions nonetheless have global effects. In contrast, 
poor countries basically do not use fossil fuels very much (per person). From this 
perspective, Dyson said he would like to see a rise in per capita fossil fuel use in 
countries like India because this is precisely what is needed if people are going to be 
lifted out of poverty. This point is often not recognised.  
Dyson suggested that the way forward was through the proposed mechanism 
of contraction and convergence. In very crude terms, a level of per capita emission 
that can be emitted should be determined, according to the need to stabilise 
emissions in the future. Those countries such as India that are below the agreed 
global level can rise to that level, while those countries above the level must come 
down to that level. He emphasised that this approach essentially injects a very 




2.2.Session Two: Population, Migration and Urbanisation 
 
For the second lecture, Professor Nigel Harris from University College London was 
invited to present on the topic of Population, Migration and Urbanisation. This was 
because of his long standing expertise and renown in working and writing on 
immigration issues. In particular, Harris became known as an advocate and defender 
of immigration in such works as Thinking the Unthinkable: the Immigration Myth 
Exposed (2001) and through his ongoing involvement in immigration issues on 
various commissions and organisations. 
 Given the population focus of the lecture series, it was expected that Harris 
would ground the discussion of migration and urbanisation in an informed 
discussion of population dynamics, continuing along the path already cleared by 
Dyson and Garenne. Indeed, Dyson’s own sweeping presentation on demographic 
transition already introduced several aspects of these topics. For example, he 
explained urbanisation as a process that is essentially caused by falling mortality 
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rather than economics. Similarly, he noted that despite much more rapid rates of 
population growth, levels of emigration from developing countries today are 
relatively far less than what Europe had experienced when it was going through its 
phase of rapid population growth in the 19th century. During the 1970s, emigration 
from Asia amounted to about 0.5 percent of the natural population increase in Asia. 
In Africa it amounted to 0.3 percent, and in Latin America emigration amounted to 
2.5 percent of natural increase. In contrast, from 1881 to 1910, emigration from 
Europe amounted to about 19.5 percent of the natural population increase in Europe 
at that time. Indeed, this is one of the often-ignored benefits of colonialism, in the 
sense that Europe profited from an important migration safety valve that siphoned 
off much of its natural population increase at a time when its demographic transition 
was potentially most destabilising. Despite perceptions of mass migration from 
South to North today, this safety valve simply does not exist in any comparable way 
for contemporary developing countries. Hence, returning to Dyson’s concluding 
point above, there is a very important moral dimension also underlying the issue of 
migration at the global level. Some leading demographers, such as Paul Demeny, 
have also pointed out the political dimensions of rapid population growth in some 
parts of the world versus population shrinking in other parts, as illustrated by 
Dyson’s comparison of Nigeria and Russia.  
 However, Harris chose to take a very different tangent in his presentation. He 
focused instead on the contradiction between the immobile bounded and territorial 
state versus the mobile global economy, and how migration brings to light the 
tension between the requirements of national political control versus the 
requirements of economic growth and development. The central contradiction, he 
argued, is between politics and economics, or between the state and the market. We 
are now in a period of transition, in which a single global economy is undermining 
the state and causing a considerable conceptual crisis in terms of how the state 
should approach this new reality. While there has been an immense wealth of 
economic studies on migration over the last three decades, he contended that the 
politics of migration are most decisive, not the economic and social impacts.  
 Harris laid out three components of this argument; the control of internal 
migration within states, international migration, and the integration of migrants. In 
terms of internal migration, he argued that, historically, a central preoccupation of 
states had been to identify and control their populations, in order to prevent or 
regulate mobility and also to supply armies with soldiers. For instance, we saw very 
tight forms of internal population control in Tsarist Russia, in Fredrick’s Prussia, in 
Tokugawa Japan, and in the feudal systems of Europe. This aspect became more and 
more important with the rise of modern nation-states and the drawing of boundaries, 
and it was only limited by administrative capacity and other preoccupations. 
Modern examples include Soviet Russia and Maoist China, both of which used strict 
internal controls over the movement of their populations. He explained that these 
cases show how illegal migration was an internal phenomenon before it became an 
external phenomenon. In essence, the state sacrifices the formation of a national 
labour market based on the free mobility of people for the sake of controlling the 
population. It sacrifices the economics and the welfare of the population to the 
politics of power. 
 In particular, every time any form of economic development begins to take 
place, Harris argued that the state has a crisis in its attempts to track its population 
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and control them. For instance, he recalled how a number of newly independent 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to control their populations. This was in 
the heady days of planning, when it was deemed that people should be moved 
according to the dictates of the plan, even if by force, including brief cases in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Tanzania. Planners determined where 
populations ought to be in the light of the interests of the state rather than allowing 
people to respond to economic incentives. Two well known cases include the past 
apartheid system in South Africa, in which the majority of the population were 
classified as foreigners, and Israeli-occupied Palestine, where similar mechanisms are 
still in place. He also spent some time describing the system of hukou (household 
registration) in China, started by Mao from the 1950s onwards and continued in post-
Mao China after 1978 up to the present. He argued that the central concern of all 
these mechanisms is control. 
 Harris suggested that migration is possibly the biggest single factor in the 
world for redistributing income from rich areas to poor areas. The cost of political 
control over migration can be seen as a reduction of such redistribution. Hence, 
immigration control in Europe and the United States sustains the poverty of 
developing countries. Conversely, if we would allow free movements of people, we 
could raise the income of developing countries far more rapidly than any other 
programme. Despite this immense potential for radical world poverty reduction, 
immigration debates in Europe and North America are not about the economics, but 
about political sovereignty. Harris contended that this constitutes an existential crisis 
for the state. 
 In terms of international migration, Harris argued that economic globalisation 
has already produced an immense increase in the mobility of capital and, to a lesser 
extent, labour. While various governments, such as in the UK or the Netherlands, 
have attempted to prevent immigration, the other side of the coin is the emigration of 
businesses to places where cheaper labour is located. These two go together; 
governments have to make a choice between allowing immigration and allowing 
businesses to go elsewhere. In the first case, the movement of labour has been 
happening throughout the history of capitalism, first through slavery, then 
indentured workers, and then through the free migration of Europeans. He cited a 
UN estimate that perhaps 150 million people immigrated between 1970 and 2000, 
although he thought that this was a wild underestimate given that it is based on the 
number of people living outside their country of birth.  
 The process today is exaggerated in the developed countries given the 
potential end of what Harris called national self-sufficiency in labour due to low 
fertility; no developed country now produces an adequate labour force to run its own 
economy. This point becomes particularly poignant as governments aim to increase 
the skill-intensity of their workforces. Developed countries have faced this goal by 
increasingly importing skills. The US census in 2000 showed that 47 percent of 
scientists and engineers with PhDs were foreign-born. In other words, a larger and 
larger component of the skilled labour force in the United States is immigrant.  
Hence, the whole drive to become a skill-intensive economy exaggerates this 
dependence on imported labour. It also has effects on developing countries, causing 
them to specialise in the supply of such skilled labour. For instance, the Philippines 
government had a deliberate policy of overproducing nurses and merchant seamen 
in order to supply the rest of the world with these skilled workers. Similarly, India is 
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aiming to capture world engineering. This movement of highly skilled people from 
the developing to the developed countries simultaneously prevents developing 
countries from being able to emulate the developed, although outsourcing to 
developing countries compensates for this. Harris thought that governments’ 
responses to the financial crisis were major reaffirmations of the priority of national 
political power against these compensating aspects of the mobile economy. He did 
not think that such protectionism could win.  
 On the subject of integration, Harris reflected that the trouble with the 
migration debate is that it is still being framed in terms of people having places of 
belonging and migration being a disturbance to this belonging. He claimed that the 
debate on integration arises because all migrants are treated as actual or potential 
settlers rather than as circulating workers. He then framed this in terms of economic 
globalisation and asked; why does it matter where people belong to? Governments, 
he claimed, are resisting the fact that economics is washing away nationality, 
although they are also making all sorts of adjustments to this reality, particularly 
with regard to satisfying their need for circulating skilled workers. In this sense, the 
integration debate is not about people responding to work opportunities and 
circulating, but about joining the club of the ‘nation’, which is supposed to be a 
privilege. Hence, it becomes a political question rather than an economic question 
about labour requirements. However, a problem arises when we realise that nations 
are formed in an arbitrary manner and people become members of nations often by 
accident. Using nationality as a criterion to define membership to a ‘nation’ then 
becomes difficult, he argued, similar to defining national values, which becomes an 
exercise in vanity and prejudice.  
 
 Although Harris presented a provoking argument, it could have benefited  
from more factual substantiation, given that the point of the lecture series was to 
refocus attention towards a scientifically-informed debate about the population 
dimensions of these issues, particularly with respect to family planning and sexual 
and reproductive health and rights. Unfortunately, this dimension was absent in 
Harris’ presentation, although the subsequent debate with the audience made up for 
some of the slack.  
 
 Dr Mahmood Messkoub, the discussant, first reviewed Harris’ overall 
argument, highlighting that migration had always been an important part of both 
nation building and labour supply to rapidly growing urban areas and industries in 
19th century Britain and Europe. However, migrants have always been looked upon 
with apprehension; their labour is wanted but not them. He argued that, despite this 
separation between labour and labourer, in reality, labour is embedded in people, 
and these people migrate and they have cultural heritage.  
 Messkoub then brought the focus back to the demographics by discussing 
population ageing in richer developed countries. Migration, he noted, is a very 
important response to this. Migrants provide care for the elderly and for other parts 
of the labour-intensive care sector. If they are legal, they pay taxes. Even if they are 
not legal, they contribute to higher business profits. This is also the case in richer 
developing countries, such as rich oil exporting countries, where a lot of the care and 
construction work is done by immigrants from poor developing countries. Many 
migrants work in the 3D sectors; dirty, dangerous and/or demanding, but they are 
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demanded for many other trades as well, from carpentry to information technology. 
Hence, the rich countries gain from a lot of brain gain, and developing countries lose 
from brain drain. Even if we talk about unskilled immigrants, poor countries are still 
deprived of the labour, especially considering that the age of most migrants is 
concentrated in the most economically-active cohort, i.e. 25-40 years old.  
 Having said that, Messkoub agreed with Harris’ point that remittances 
provide considerable compensation and many countries are taking advantage of 
immigration in order to cultivate remittances, as in the case of Philippines. Studies 
have shown that 10 to 15 percent of brain drain can be managed internally in 
developing countries, partly through reorganizing the labour force and partly 
through ongoing capacity training. Obviously, countries like India have more 
capacity to adjust in this respect than countries like Ghana, but the possibility still 
exists, he argued. Nonetheless, brain drain amounts to a form of effective subsidy to 
rich countries given that the costs of educating and training the émigré are borne by 
the poor country. Messkoub suggested that there should be some international 
transfer of resources from receiving countries to sending countries in order to 
compensate for such deskilling.  
 Following this last point, Messkoub commented on the difference between 
immigration control and immigration management. He argued that, in fact, the EU 
does not have a migration policy, although it definitely has migration control 
because each country retains the prerogative to decide who to accept and who to 
refuse. As a result, the EU has a problem as a unit because it has freedom of capital 
and goods, although freedom of labour is more problematic. Even with the removal 
of borders, population control takes place through the institutionalized channels of 
education, health, employment, etc. The Italian government is now proposing to fine 
people who rent rooms to illegal migrants, bringing the imposition of control from  
borders into peoples’ daily lives. Similarly, the Netherlands has ID cards, which are 
used to control migrants.  
 The creation of the EU, Messkoub suggested, has not solved this balance 
between management and control. Indeed, he argued that there is a tendency to 
criminalise migrants. In most countries, migration is seen as a matter of the ministry 
of justice or interior, rather than as a labour market issue. In this regard, he 
concluded that it is important to distinguish between the short-term and long-term 
sides of migration policy making. In the short term, legalization and regulation of 
status is important, along with access to welfare and education. These are basic 
human rights and you cannot deny them, especially to the children of migrants. In 
the medium and long term, issues of family reunion, political rights, social security 
rights, and linking immigration to labour market needs should be on the agenda.  
  
In what turned out to be the most contentious of the six sessions, the two 
presentations stirred considerable debate from the audience. Part of the contention 
came from the fact that Harris had simply not addressed urbanisation, one of the 
topics of the session. To this he answered that he was talking about the dynamic 
change in the use of territories, which is what urbanization is, i.e. the sudden 
emergence of high productivity areas, pulling in labour from all over the place, 
which starts within countries. Labour is moving around because of the instable and 
dynamic character of territorial economy. Interestingly, in this response, Harris chose 
to ignore a well-established body of thought regarding urbanisation among 
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prominent demographers such as Jan De Vries and Samuel Preston, which attributes 
urbanisation primarily to falling mortality rather than economic factors. Indeed, this 
helps to understand why many poor countries have continued to experience rapid 
urban growth and urbanisation even in the midst of urban economic crisis, such as 
during the debt crisis in the 1980s in Latin America and Africa. For similar reasons, it 
would also help to explain international migration, albeit the precise direction of 
international flows is obviously guided by the enormous disparities between 
remuneration in poor and rich countries.   
Harris was also further queried on his position regarding what the optimal 
policy of regulating immigration to the EU should be, including one such question 
from the chair of the session, Professor Ashwani Saith. Harris responded by 
returning to his argument that the whole discussion is dominated by the interests of 
states, not of people. He suggested that people are capable of enormous flexibility, 
but states are not. Hence, the existential crisis of the state is a crisis of political power 
rather than of populations. He explained that he has doubts about the scheme of 
compensating developing countries because it suggests that states own their 
populations and can therefore be compensated for them; we would be moving 
towards a kind of slavery with that system. He did not think it could be achieved 
politically in any case, nor is it ethically or morally right. Instead, peoples’ right to 
move should be defended. Because many refugees are desperate to go home, 
protecting their rights to move would also allow them to do so, whereas the current 
system discourages them from doing so. Regarding ideal policy, he argued that it is 
important to recognise the overwhelming and growing dependence on foreign 
labour in places like the UK, and how states protect the native born population. 
When the native born have bad jobs, this is addressed in terms of inequality, not in 
terms of belonging, even though many native-born also do not feel that they belong 
anywhere. Thus, he would like the UK to move towards a much more flexible system 
in which employers could recruit directly. There are schemes emerging, but they are 
enormously unwieldy, bureaucratic and slow, and the unwieldiness of the 
bureaucratic machine makes it impossible to fill the changing labour market 
demands. This is why he thought we must move towards an idea of circulating 
labour rather than immigration. People will go home if they have the right to come 
back again.  
 While many aspects of Harris’ argument are appealing, we must nonetheless 
query whether the ability of people to be flexible is not itself supported by many 
state functions, in which case, removing state regulation might undermine the very 
sustenance of the economic system. This idea was beyond the dichotomies that 
Harris relied on to make his argument which, ironically, was quite neoliberal in 
undertone given that it relied on a liberal rhetoric in order to justify a strong anti-
statist attitude. Similar to family planning, while we might decry the abuses, 
inequities and discrimination embodied in current immigration policies, this does 
not mean that we should throw out the baby with the bath water and abandon 
regulation all together, for regulation is the primary mechanism by which states can 
effect progressive as well as regressive social change. However, Harris’ dismissive 
attitude towards states was equally dismissive of the enormous contribution that 
state-directed redistributive policies have made to the welfare of their populations, 
particularly since the emergence of welfare states in the 20th century, particularly in 
education and health. Indeed, Harris’ recognition of the huge leaps that many poor 
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countries have taken in the realm of education, thereby enabling them to supply 
highly-skilled labour to rich countries, contradicts the logic of his anti-statist 
posturing given that much of these achievements have been heavily subsidised by 
states, particularly at tertiary levels of education. Similarly, his dismissal of 
compensation through a seductive liberal logic overlooks the fact that the idea of 
compensation is simply yet another attempt to justify some form of redistribution at 
the global level.  
 Messkoub and Saith both returned to this issue of compensation. Messkoub 
reiterated that it comes down to a question of compensating for the public resources 
used to educate and train migrants before they leave, which the government does not 
necessarily recover. Hence, there is definitely a rational for compensation, just like 
taxation within a national system. Saith added that there are many things states do 
for their people which should not be underestimated. Moreover, in places like India, 
it is often the case that the general population subsidises the university education of 
the elite, who are the ones involved in high skilled migration. Saith argued that it is 
normal that the rest of the people would expect something in return.  
 Much of the contention was related to confusion between immigration and 
integration issues. The most interesting intervention on this point came from Dr 
Rachel Kurian, a senior lecturer in international labour economics at ISS. She noted 
that the concept of the ‘migrant’, as it is conceived in Europe, the UK, or the US, is 
often used to describe people who are not necessarily first generation migrants at all, 
but who are the second or third generations of earlier migrants, and thus no longer 
migrants given that they have been born and raised in these countries. At which 
generation will we stop calling them migrants? Kurian argued that this is a 
fundamental problem with the integration debate because it is not about migration; it 
is about citizenship concerns.  
 Kurian and others also took issue with several other ideas presented by the 
speakers. Regarding circulatory migration, Kurian fully disagreed with the ideas 
presented given that these could be used to justify reducing the security and 
protection of migrant workers. She noted that all anthropological work on this issue 
shows that circulatory migrant workers, particularly low skilled workers, prefer 
stability and want the same security that is provided to non-migrant workers. 
Similarly, with regard to the caricature that states are blocking the migration of high-
skill workers, she pointed out that the World Trade Organisation actually privileges 
the migration of skilled workers between (multinational) firms. Thanh-Dam Truong, 
an associate professor of Women, Gender and Development at ISS, supported this 
point, noting that states have been very clearly aligning their administration of 
migration in function of the vision of the WTO since the 1990s. In this light, states 
have been very capable and she doubted whether there has been any existential crisis 
of the state.  
 The debate on these issues ended in a stalemate. Messkoub explained that his 
conception of circulatory migration is simply that migrants should have the right to 
return home without losing their ability to come back again. He said that such 
systems operate in the US with Mexican migrants (although it was unclear how he 
perceived these to be non-discriminatory, non-segregationist and/or solving issues 
of labour protection). Harris withdrew from his ethical position on the issue of 
compensation in higher education, although he nonetheless questioned whether such 
a system would be politically possible. He also agreed that problems of integration 
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are not necessarily migration problems, although he stuck to his thesis on the 
existential crisis of the state.  
 
 
2.3.Session Three: Population and Generation 
 
The third session returned solidly back into the field of population studies. The main 
lecture was by John Cleland, one of the foremost international scholars in the field of 
population studies with longstanding research interests concerning fertility, family 
planning and child health in developing countries. The theme of his session was on 
generation, including issues of ageing in rich countries and the youth-population 
bulge in poor countries.  
 The first part of his presentation involved a revision of population trends over 
the last 60 years, more or less along the lines presented by Dyson in the first session. 
He further clarified that, in the context of the current demographic transition, the 
biggest component of future population growth is population momentum, which is 
the effect of age structure on birth rates. In other words, when there are a lot of 
people in a population between the ages of 20 and 40 years old, the birth rate tends to 
be elevated even if these people have small families because there are, in effect, many 
people having babies as a share of the total population. That keeps population 
growth going even in the face of fertility decline. The two other causes of future 
population growth are unwanted fertility (i.e. children that mothers declared they 
did not really want) and the continued desire of families to have more than two 
children (on average) in some world regions (Africa and South Asia in particular). 
Anything above two children tends to lead to population growth in the future. The 
mandate of family planning programmes, he clarified, is to address these second and 
third causes of population growth.  
 Cleland discussed the huge importance of age structure on human 
development, using the Republic of Korea as his example to sketch out three broad 
scenarios in the world today. In 1960, mortality had declined steeply in Korea, but 
average fertility was still above 6 births per woman, resulting in a rapidly growing 
population structure, similar to Africa today; 45 percent of Korea’s population in 
1960 was under 15 years old and only a tiny fraction were 65 and older. From 1960 
onwards, a steady fertility decline ensued, falling to well below replacement at about 
1.5 births per women by 2000. By this time, the working age population of Korea was 
at a maximum relative to the total population, which is known as the ‘demographic 
dividend (or bonus)’. This is considered very favourable for economic development 
because you have an exceptionally high ratio of potential workers to dependent 
young and old. In other words, between 1960 and 2000, the number of workers per 
dependents doubled in Korea. However, this situation will not last. By 2040, the 
swollen mid-range of the population will have aged and the ratio of workers to 
dependents will return to the level it was at in 1960, except this time older people 
will be much more numerous than young people, with 20-30 percent of the 
population aged 65 and older. Cleland emphasised that this is the destination of 
humanity; there is no escape.  
 Europe is already at the point where Korea will be in 2040. As it stands now, 
fertility in Europe is at roughly 1.5 births per women, ranging from two in France to 
a little over one in Russia and the Mediterranean countries. Under such conditions, 
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the proportion of people aged over 65 and over 80 is bound to increase in Europe for 
the next 45 years. Inversely, the number of people aged 15-64 compared to the 
number of elderly is going to diminish, from eight-to-one in 1950 to two-to-one. If 
these fertility rates do not change, the population pyramid will become inverted, 
with each younger age group getting smaller in size than the last. At the current rate, 
the European population will halve every 65 years if not sustained by immigration. 
This is a prospect that delights environmentalists but horrifies economists and 
politicians, given that the ever-decreasing labour force that will have to support a 
giant number of old people. It also alarms politicians because Europe’s role in world 
affaires is almost bound to diminish if it does halve in size every 65 years.  
 The immigration implications are useful to put into perspective. It is thought, 
Cleland explained, that immigration to Europe was about a million a year in the late 
1990s. This number would need to double in order to keep the population from 
declining. The number of migrants would need to triple in order to keep the 
population aged 15-64 constant in size. The number of immigrants per year would 
need to quadruple in order to keep the ratio of people aged 15-64 to those aged over 
65 above three-to-one. It is obvious, he argued, that immigration has a positive role 
to play in Europe’s development, although even at a large scale, it would not be able 
to make a serious impact on population ageing. In other words, Europe has to 
seriously adapt to the greying of its population. To do this, Cleland suggested that 
we need to reform pension systems; we need to increase labour force participation; 
and, above all, we need to raise the retirement age. Countries with very low fertility 
should also try to raise fertility by making childbearing and parenthood more 
compatible with work. He pointed out that the countries in Europe with the highest 
rates of female labour force participation also have the highest fertility. He suggested 
that crisis could be averted if fertility edges up towards replacement levels.  
 The group of countries that are similar to Korea now basically includes most 
of Asia and Latin America, where fertility has generally declined from six to three. 
This gives rise to an age structure that looks like Korea. The priority in these 
countries is to increase employment, which can lead to economic strength given the 
very favourable age structure for rapid social and economic development. On the 
other hand, Cleland argued that the demographic bonus could turn sour if other 
conditions are not fulfilled. For instance, if employment perspectives are poor, the 
youth bulge (i.e. the growing population aged 15-24) could lead to a situation prone 
to civil unrest and extremism. The other priority for Asia and Latin America is to 
reduce the very large differences in child bearing between rich and poor, particularly 
that the large fertility differentials tend to entrench income inequalities.  
 The group of countries with high rates of population growth and fertility, like 
Korea in 1960, are mostly in Africa. Cleland explained that these characteristics are 
disadvantageous for economic and social development. Half the population in this 
sort of structure is under the age of fifteen, which is unfavourable for increasing 
human capital and for generating the savings to invest in increasing physical capital 
per worker. Instead, huge resources have to be devoted merely to educating, feeding, 
clothing and housing this massive section of the population that consumes more than 
it produces. For instance, it is challenging for governments when the school-aged 
population is doubling every 25 years, which is currently the case in Africa. The 
problem, he suggested, is not that Africa is overpopulated but that it is more difficult 
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to accumulate the human and physical capital necessary to escape from poverty with 
a population growth rate of 2 to 3 percent per year.  
 However, painting Africa with the same brush is a mistake, Cleland noted, 
given that regional fertility trends in Africa are very diverse. For instance, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe already have very low fertility. East Africa, West Africa and 
Central Africa are very different. Fertility decline had tentatively begun in these 
regions in the 1980s but seems to have petered out in some countries and slowed 
down in many others. Like Dyson and Garenne, Cleland attributed this to very low 
levels of contraception use. Moreover, desired family size remains much higher in 
these regions, typically in the range of four, five, or possibly six children. This is a 
quite different reproductive culture from Asia or Latin America fifty years ago, 
where desired family sizes were in the range of two, three or possibly four. In other 
words, we are dealing with a pro-natalist part of the world where, for whatever 
reason, the value attached to children is much greater than elsewhere.  
 This situation is hostile to development, which he demonstrated through the 
example of Niger, a Sahelian country that has lost half of its arable land to the Sahara 
Desert and has recently suffered from famine and food shortage. The indicators for 
Niger were as follows: the population in 2009 was about 16 million people; its total 
fertility rate was eight births per woman; and the percentage of couples using 
modern contraception was four percent. If these traits continue, the population will 
reach 80 million by 2050, bigger than any European country. Even if fertility declines 
to 3.6, as the UN expects, the population will still reach 50 million by 2050. Cleland 
suggested that the consequences are very predictable. Niger will continue to be 
unable to feed its population and to depend on food aid; its fragile ecosystem will be 
depleted by cropping and overgrazing; and the population will continue to 
experience mass poverty and mass underemployment. He suggested that Niger is a 
severe case, although it is not totally exceptional. Cleland admitted that he might be 
shouting catastrophe and discounting human ingenuity over the next few decades. 
But he also questioned what the alternatives might be. Does Niger have uranium? 
Could it mass migrate to neighbouring countries? Could it survive on remittances? 
He remained convinced that the future of Niger will be a disaster unless it achieves a 
much sharper fertility reduction.   
 On a more positive note, Cleland discussed Kenya in Africa as an example of 
how a population can be galvanized and mobilized to achieve huge reproductive 
changes in a short period of time given the political will.  In the late 1970s, a fertility 
survey done in Kenya showed very high desired family size (7.7). Nobody was using 
contraception and the average fertility rate was 8 births per women. The government 
then began a mobilisation campaign and a vast expansion of family planning 
services, including social marketing of condoms and pills and the introduction of 
family planning in every health centre, hospital and community. The country 
achieved a reproductive miracle: the desired family size dropped dramatically; the 
percentage using contraception rose steeply from 7 percent in 1978 to 33 percent in 
1993; and the fertility rate dropped from 8 to 5.4 births per woman. Unfortunately, 
the success soured in Kenya when money, energy and will, and vehicles and staff, 
were diverted from family planning to HIV. As a result, fertility decline stagnated at 
just above 5 births per woman. Indeed, the UN had to shift their 2050 population 
prediction for Kenya from 44 to 83 million as a result.  
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 In conclusion, Cleland set out the case for renewed investment in family 
planning. He argued that there need not be a clash between reproductive rights and 
demographic or economic imperatives because the countries where demography 
causes severe problems are also the countries where the self-declared need for 
contraception tends to be greatest. He suggested that economic and social 
development and demography should set the priority for population stabilization, 
which needs to become a priority for Africa again, whereas human rights should be 
important in determining how to actually implement policies to reach population 
stabilization. Rights have a role to play, although they are not a satisfactory way of 
establishing priorities. We have just lost the plot, he contended, by delinking family 
planning from development, after which funding simply fell away given that 
ministries of finance and the World Bank are not interested in reproductive rights; 
they are interested in poverty and hunger alleviation. Unless we make that link 
again, investment in family planning will continue to decline and African 
governments will be given no encouragement to do anything about it.  
  
 Following this impassioned appeal for family planning, Professor Joris 
Voorhoeve led the discussion with some reflections on Cleland’s lecture. In 
particular, he placed emphasis on the role of increasing female autonomy and also on 
the crucial importance of contraception in reducing fertility, which he thought 
should be advocated at the highest level in international organizations and in Dutch 
development cooperation. He drew a conclusion from Cleland’s lecture that it would 
be wise for the EU to allow Turkey to join the Union given the severe labour 
shortages that the region will face. He also spent some time discussing Cleland’s 
suggestion for a flexible retirement policy and the need to adjust to lower energy 
consumption per capita.  
 The issues raised in the subsequent discussion with the audience centred on 
the question of how to reinvigorate a family planning agenda, on Cleland’s 
suggestions for adaptation and immigration in Europe, or else on various aspects of 
his somewhat Malthusian outlook for Africa. On the first point, the director of WPF 
asked about research on the cost effectiveness of family planning. Cleland answered 
that such research has been done by the Futures Group. This looked at how much it 
would save to meet the unmet need for contraception based on savings from the 
reduced number of unwanted children in terms of costs of immunization, obstetric 
services, clean water, impregnated bed nets, reduced primary education cost, etc. The 
benefit-cost ratio for 17 African countries was 3 or 4 to 1, i.e. if you spend 1000 dollars 
to meet the unmet need of family planning, you save 3000 to 4000 dollars on the cost 
of meeting other MDG indicators. Cleland thought it was pretty good research. 
However, in replying to another question from a participant from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affaires, Cleland also recognised that foreigners cannot do much to change 
attitudes in Africa; this is a matter of political will and requires that political leaders 
are on board. For instance, he would like to see Yuweri Museveni, the President of 
Uganda, replaced by a ‘saner’ president who takes seriously the trebling of the 
Ugandan population from 35 million today to about 120 million by 2050, as is 
currently projected for Uganda. Notably, Uganda has one of the highest levels of 
unmet need in Africa, which means that the population could also respond very 
quickly to some serious policy interventions.  
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 Several ISS staff also added additional perspective to these issues in the 
discussion period. Messkoub (the discussant of the previous session) emphasised the 
importance of social policy, particularly universal social policy, in bringing about 
these changes given their central role in supporting mortality reduction, among other 
considerations. Loes Keysers, Lecturer in Women and Development Studies at ISS, 
clarified that the main shift that happened in the preparation for the Cairo conference 
with regard to development was that we no longer talked about population being a 
problem but about people having a problem. She suggested that Cleland’s lecture 
was dominated by an older technical or social engineering perspective on fertility, 
based on making contraception available for the huge unmet need. Cleland replied 
that he supported the marriage between rights and development, but felt that rights 
cannot set the agenda. He also added that it is important not to assume that all family 
planning programmes in the 1970s and 1980s were coercive. The idea, he argued, that 
old-fashioned family planning or population stabilization programmes were by their 
very nature coercive is travesty of history.  
 Regarding the questions and comments on mortality decline and its relation to 
fertility, Cleland answered that this is very complex and he did not think many 
people understand it. Fertility is reduced in a wide range of mortality situations. 
There is no mechanical relationship between mortality decline and fertility decline, 
although in the long run it is true that once mortality declines, fertility will 
eventually decline as well because the alternative is endless growth. However, in the 
short term, people generally do not have a good idea of what is happening to 
mortality. This is one reason why there is not an automatic response between falling 
mortality and fertility. The link is so varied and contingent in the short term because 
it depends on other factors. Policies and education can make a huge difference in 
reducing that gap between mortality decline and fertility response. He agreed that 
obvious health and other considerations are also important, but the problem is that 
family planning has almost dropped out of the picture in comparison to these other 
concerns. Family planning should be a priority of human development and, in any 
case, he could not think of any country that has pressed ahead with family planning 
while ignoring other dimensions of human welfare. The two have usually gone 
together.    
 
 
2.4.Session Four: Population and Gender 
 
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo 
was already brought to attention and contention in the lecture of Cleland. It was 
subsequently brought centre stage in the session on population and gender led by 
Mari Simonen. She reminded us that it has been the fifteenth year of implementation 
since the Cairo conference, which produced a 20-year action plan. Thus, it is high 
time we revisit and evaluate the vision that was formulated in Cairo, as well as what 
has been since achieved and what still needs to be done, particularly in light of all of 
the other overlapping crises happening today.  
 Simonen argued that we still need a strengthened commitment to the 
implementation of the Cairo Programme of Action, i.e. of women’s health and rights. 
This is not an issue of charity; it is a very central responsibility in terms of ensuring a 
better future for everybody. Her logic was that the struggle for women’s rights and 
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gender equality is at the heart of the struggle for human rights in general and for 
global progress in all aspects of our societies.  
 Revisiting Cairo, she recalled that 179 countries were involved in Cairo and 
that the participation of women and women’s groups was very important in the 
preparations and also in the conference outcome itself. This was based on several 
understandings. First, the biological and social roles that are imposed on women 
have a big impact on population trends and dynamics, including fertility levels and 
migration. Moreover, women’s reproductive roles are too often emphasized over 
their productive roles in society, even though their reproductive roles are not always 
given the value and support that is needed. Therefore, women are not supported in 
making choices and in being able to control their own destinies. They are not even 
supported in their caregiver roles. It was also understood that the low status of 
women contributes to high mortality for women and children and to the spread of 
HIV. Given these understandings, gender equality and women’s empowerment were 
placed at the center of the international agenda for population and development for 
the first time at the Cairo Conference. 
 This constituted a radical shift in thinking. Simonen explained that it was a 
policy shift away from a demographic approach of thinking in terms of numbers, to a 
more balanced approach of thinking in terms of human beings, individuals, and 
human rights. Issues that were considered private were put into the public domain 
for the first time. In particular, the fourth principle of the Cairo Programme 
addressed gender equality and the empowerment of women, and then went further 
by placing emphasis on concrete actions, polices, programmes and laws. Four areas 
include: the elimination of discrimination and violence against women; improving 
women’s access to secure livelihoods and economic resources; the removal of 
impediments to women’s participation in public life; and the balancing of 
responsibilities in work and family.  
 As a result, the Cairo Programme is a very comprehensive and forward-
looking agenda. The fact that the leaders who were gathered were able to agree on 
these issues for the first time bears testimony to this revolutionary moment. 
Moreover, they were able to agree despite the fact that the 179 countries represented 
all regions, all countries, all kinds of cultures, all religions, and all beliefs. The 
conference was not without controversy, but Simonen pointed out that these leaders 
did manage to come together and agree nonetheless, and it is an international 
consensus. Luckily, these objectives and targets were reinforced and reaffirmed in 
other conferences, such as the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing the 
year after, and they have been incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals.  
 The agreed meaning of reproductive health was; a state of complete physical, 
mental and social wellbeing in all matters that relate to the reproductive system and 
to its functioning and processes. Simonen explained that this was visionary because 
health was conceived not only in physical terms but also in terms of mental and 
social wellbeing. It implies that people should be able to have a satisfying and safe 
sex life and that they should have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to 
decide if, when and how often to do so, as a very basic principle of human rights, 
free of violence, coercion and discrimination. Therefore, reproductive health includes 
the right of men and women to have access to methods of family planning of their 
choice, and other methods of fertility regulation, so long as these are not against the 
law. Reproductive health also includes the right of access to appropriate health care 
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that enables women to have a safe pregnancy and child birth, and that enables 
couples and individuals to have a healthy infant. Moreover, it includes sexual health, 
not only with respect to sexually transmitted infections, but also with respect to 
enhancing life and personal relations.  
 Despite this progress, Simonen highlighted three issues that require our 
attention today. These are: girls’ education; sexual and reproductive health; and 
gender based violence. Regarding the first, there has been progress in getting girls 
into educational programmes. Worldwide, more children are in primary school than 
ever before, including girls. For example, in developing countries as a whole, the 
number of girls enrolled for every 100 boys rose from 91 in 1999 to 95 in 2007. 
However, the ratio also varies very much by country, especially at the secondary 
level. In Chad, less than four girls attended high school for every 10 boys in 2005, 
with little progress since 1990. On the other hand, girls in Bangladesh actually have 
gained equality with boys at the high school level during the past fifteen years. She 
noted that such education is a good thing in itself and it also has a beneficial impact 
on many other factors that determine the lives of people and especially girls, such as 
lower risk of death and disease, fewer and healthier children, and better income and 
wages. She warned that our challenge now, in the face of economic troubles, is to 
make sure that the progress is not taken for granted and that we continue to make 
the case for investing in education and education of girls.  
 In terms of access to sexual and reproductive health, Simonen said that we can 
also see progress. For example, today there are more births that are attended by 
skilled health personnel. In East Asia, nearly every birth is now assisted by skilled 
health workers and substantial improvements have been registered in Latin America 
and North Africa. In the area of family planning we also see that more women and 
couples are choosing to actually plan their families, including spacing and 
determining the number of children they are having. More women and men are 
using modern contraception and birth rates have declined in all regions. Maternal 
health outcomes have improved, particularly with regard to ending obstetric fistula, 
a preventable and/or treatable childbirth injury.  
 However, she also cautioned that every year more than half a million women 
continue to die during pregnancy and/or childbirth from problems that are largely 
preventable. Maternal mortality, she claimed, remains the largest health inequity in 
the world and it is the Millennium Development Goal that is lagging the furthest 
behind. Of all the health indicators, maternal mortality displays the biggest gaps 
between rich and poor both within countries and between countries. The risk of a 
woman dying as a result of pregnancy and child birth in the Netherlands is one in 
10,000, a very rare event. In Niger, it is one in seven. Yet despite being a huge issue, it 
is not given the attention it requires, albeit the Dutch government has taken a very 
important initiative on this front. 
 In particular, Simonen noted three interventions that we know work for better 
maternal health. First, voluntary family planning enables those who do not want to 
fall pregnant to delay or avoid pregnancy. Second is the provision of skilled care 
during delivery for those who are pregnant, which in most places involves 
midwives, as in the Netherlands. Third is the availability of transportation to 
emergency care for those who actually experience a complication during delivery. In 
sum, it is estimated that ensuring access to family planning could reduce maternal 
death by 25 to 40 percent and child death by as much as 20 percent. It is very 
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important to recall that making family planning available is not just about choice but 
also about avoiding deaths.  
 Regarding the use of modern contraception, the percentage of women 
worldwide using contraception rose from 47 percent to 56 percent over the last 15 
years, although Simonen noted that this again varies greatly across regions. The use 
is highest in Asia, followed by Latin America, the Caribbean, South Asia and then 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Her elaboration on this point was more or less a reiteration of 
similar points made by Cleland in the previous lecture, particularly with regard to 
unmet need. She cautioned that, despite the progress, there remains a high level of 
unmet need for family planning, which is exacerbated by the reduction in funding 
for family planning, both in amount and as a percentage of the total population 
funding. Much of the funding has been diverted to HIV/AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted infections. While funding for HIV is a good thing, she cautioned that it 
should not be increased at the cost of family planning funding.  
 On the third issue of ending gender based violence and harmful practices, she 
argued that it is essential to work in partnership with as many groups as possible.  
The good news is that today there is a rising tide of public opinion in all countries 
against violence directed towards women, which is often supported by laws. There is 
also some progress in abandoning the practice of female genital mutilation, based on 
partnerships of reaching out to different kinds of people in communities and 
working with men, particularly male leaders. At UNFPA, they have found that 
understanding cultural realities often reveals very good ways to change harmful 
practices and to advance human rights.  
 Women activists, Simonen concluded, cannot do all of this work alone. They 
need to reach out. It is not a matter of women, but a matter of societies, including 
men and women, and together we are stronger. She suggested some ways of moving 
the agenda forward through fast and concrete action, and by looking at the many 
innovative activities that are being done everywhere and bringing them together on a 
larger scale to reach more people. This includes reaching out to NGOs, civil society 
groups and particularly young people, who have lots of good ideas. Funding is also 
needed, both from community budgets and international development assistance. 
She ended by stressing that each one of us can do something to advance the vision of 
Cairo by collecting and sharing information and challenging pessimism, which she 
argued is a very easy way of not doing anything. Instead, we can be a generation and 
a movement that help to finally put an end to violence and discrimination against 
girls and women.  
  
 The discussant, Wendy Harcourt, agreed with much of Simonen’s talk, 
although she also offered some very interesting critical reflections on the Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) agenda, as referred to in the introduction 
of this report. Much of this was based on her recent book; Body Politics in 
Development, which itself is based on 20 years of dialogue with organizations like 
UNFPA.  She clarified that she is very positive about the achievements of the Cairo 
conference and particularly the role of UNFPA. However, in her role as discussant, 
she raised some issues that she sees as problematic and challenging. These related to 
questions of what the progress really represents, who is counting the progress, and 
where are we going to stand in this context.   
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 In this respect, Harcourt maintained that her views on the successes of Cairo 
were somewhat different from Simonen’s, particularly with respect to the MDGs.  
She clarified that she was at Cairo on the other side of the fence as one of the 
advocates. The event, she reflected, mobilized many thousands of women’s health 
and rights movements. It was a very fascinating political process that was not just 
about 179 government representatives, but also about advocacy and about 
negotiations that went into the night. Even within the women’s movement, there 
were differences between different countries and different regions. There were very 
different types of women groups, as well as very different types of bureaucrats. 
There was no mutual context of women advocacy groups, and yet all of these 
differences had to be worked out and the various groups had to work together. 
Harcourt absolutely agreed with Simonen that the process really set the agenda for 
population and development policy. It did bring in women’s rights, it did bring in 
gender equality, and it certainly brought in once-very taboo topics of sexuality and 
sexual health, or the moving of private to public as Simonen called it. For Harcourt, 
this sense that women had a lot more autonomy and empowerment, and were really 
trying to talk about cultural difference, was the huge successes of Cairo.  
 Harcourt’s disappointments, however, included issues that were both on and 
off the agenda. To start with, the Cairo Programme was not a legally binding 
convention. Thus, follow-up was particularly problematic, especially with regard to 
funding. In other words, there was a problem of pushing a democratic human rights 
framework without discussing the economic framework of the agreement. This 
problem becomes particularly acute now, in the face of economic crisis. 
 Another hitch, according to Harcourt, was about how to make change happen 
on the ground. How do we get the medical establishment talking about the choices of 
women? How do we bring about self-esteem and knowledge? How do you talk 
about your own body? How do you talk about choice within different cultures? What 
are the types of appropriate technologies that allow women at different life stages to 
talk about those choices? These are very big issues which she thought the whole 
agenda still needs to deal with and they take a lot of time; fifteen years is a very short 
time when you are talking about these types of social changes. The issues are 
extremely complex, difficult issues and unfortunately there will not be one blueprint, 
as was argued in Cairo, which is going to help everybody.  
 Broaching more controversial topics, Harcourt argued that a more 
fundamental problem with Cairo is that there are important systemic inequalities in 
health systems which Cairo could not help to deal with. The global economic order is 
not concurrent with the Cairo agenda, she contended, particularly in terms of 
market-oriented approaches within health systems or other economic issues. 
Moreover, the priorities of Cairo were not the priorities of the overall neoliberal 
development agenda, which helps to explain why there was less funding for family 
planning and reproductive health, while funding for HIV/AIDS went up. Several 
prominent people wrote about this, such Rosalind Petchesky, a well-known sexual 
rights and reproductive health activist, or Mohan Rao, a doctor in India.  
 Again moving to even more controversial horizons, Harcourt shifted her gaze 
onto the diversion of the Cairo agenda into the MDG agenda. While she totally 
agreed that maternal, infant and child mortality are crucial issues, she was concerned 
that the way these issues were put up front in the MDG agenda lost the feminist lens 
of the sexual and reproductive rights agenda. It shifted away from sexual and 
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reproductive rights and towards ensuring women’s wellbeing and health. This was 
political as much as anything else, she argued, and it was a very sad shift. Cairo was 
a negotiated document while the MDGs were far less so. Indeed, reproductive health 
was added to the eight MDG indicators almost as an afterthought. Hence, the way 
that the MDGs have taken up population and gender issues has moved towards a 
much more technical and medical approach, while neglecting political issues, the 
need for systemic change, or the understanding that health systems are not just about 
delivery but about core social institutions at the heart of equity, social exclusion, and 
gender biases.  
 From this perspective, she suggested that the essential problem with the Cairo 
agenda was that it put sexual and reproductive health and rights on the agenda, but 
at a difficult time when neoliberal economic discourses did not allow for some of the 
more systemic issues to be taken up in any substantive way. At the same time, the 
very big focus on women-centered issues actually deflected attention away from the 
political context in which Cairo was taking place. This is one of the reasons Cairo has 
not worked, she suggested, because there is a central dilemma at the heart of it. This 
needs to be reopened and discussed now, particularly given the current financial and 
economic crisis, and of course the environmental and care crises as well.  
 Harcourt concluded her talk by reflecting on the shift of funding priorities 
towards HIV/AIDS, which has become very much accepted. However, this focus on 
HIV does not refer to males’ sexual and reproductive responsibility for children, only 
to males’ sexual pleasure. It is almost the opposite of Cairo, which had talked about 
women’s reproductive responsibility, not women’s sexual pleasure. There are many 
cultural reasons for this, but it is nonetheless interesting how the discussion of 
danger and pleasure with regard to HIV could occur because it was about male 
pleasure. Yet, at the same time, reproductive health and rights are not just women’s 
issues; in many cultures it is the men who decide. Indeed, it is quite ironic, she 
pointed out, that the reproductive health and population lobby fail to talk about 
men’s responsibility for fathering children and yet they are seen as the providers of 
the children, often legally ‘owning’ the children.  
 In this light, one challenge is to try to reconstruct parenthood so that women 
have rights over their own children, which in many contexts is not possible. Harcourt 
suggested that it is really important that we stop seeing reproductive rights as simply 
concerning female bodies and women’s rights only. She argued that men need to 
take up their responsibilities. The other challenge is also to talk about women’s own 
pleasure. Indeed, there is little discussion in the HIV discourse about women’s own 
pleasure and there is little discussion in the population discourse about sexual rights, 
as opposed to reproductive rights. Harcourt was concerned with the discussion of 
unmet needs because she wondered what sort of unmet needs we are talking about; 
unmet needs for contraception or unmet needs for women to enjoy their own bodies 
and their own pleasure. She thought that these points have been missed in the debate 
over HIV/AIDS versus reproductive health and rights.  
  
 Following Harcourt’s lead, the subsequent discussion opened the contention 
even further. Several people referred back to the previous lectures, particularly the 
sense of urgency expressed by both Dyson and Cleland about the need for 
population control and whether this had been lost in the SRHRs agenda. Some 
questioned the relevance of Cairo now, 15 years later, particularly given the lack of 
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financial commitment, as noted by Harcourt. Others raised the issue of 
fundamentalist religious groups, whether Christian or Islamic, how they should be 
approached from a sexual and reproductive health and rights perspective, and 
whether cultural sensitivity should be applied. 
 Simonen replied to the first volley of such questions by reiterating that a lot 
has been done since Cairo and that there is political commitment. However, as 
pointed out by Harcourt, these things also take time, particularly when there are so 
many other competing issues and crises in the world. The agenda is still relevant, she 
asserted, and we are doing things but we need to do more to complete it. We can do 
more by generating more support for implementation. In reply to a question on 
funding priorities, she suggested that HIV advocacy has been much more successful 
in setting agendas because it is an immediate life and death issue that touches men 
and women much more clearly, and it has been supported by urgent political 
mobilization. Regarding the debate between the so-called ‘population controllers’ 
and the so-called ‘freedom and choice, human rights based approach,’ she argued 
that these should not be seen as opposites, nor can we afford to be divided. The goal 
is the same; improved lives for individuals, families and nations. The means are 
largely agreed upon as well, in the sense that people need to be able to do family 
planning themselves, rather than being dictated through coercive means, which is 
actually counterproductive. Ultimately, she agreed that we want to reduce the size of 
the population, but we want to do it in such a way that enables every person to 
exercise their rights.  
 In contrast, Harcourt took a more provocative approach to the question of 
population control. She thought that, in many ways, this concern about population 
has very difficult implications. For instance, there is an argument, which 
environmentalist are well aware of, that we have enough wealth and the problem is 
consumption and environmental degradation by the North, not the South. This 
position questions the constant scapegoating of the poor, which places the onus on 
them to change, rather than focusing on Northern greed, particularly in relation to 
environmental or financial crises. It is not about reducing the number of people; it is 
about quality of life and wellbeing, but that also implies possibly reducing a lot of 
consumption in the richer parts of the North and South. That is a very complex 
political economy issue, not just a demographic issue.  
 Following from this point, Harcourt also questioned; where is the debate now? 
Why don’t we have strong advocacy debates and strong women’s movements 
pushing forward ideas? Where are the ideas and where are the changes? She 
speculated that this is because people have fallen into a mood of fear, particularly 
fear of the other; there are too many people out there, so we need to hold on to our 
own wellbeing. It is a sense of insecurity and fear that is linked to racism and is also 
related to the way that the media whips up a lot of issues.    
 The second round of questions focused more on implementation issues, 
particularly with regard to the mandate of UNFPA for 2014 and the positions that 
NGOs should take. One person addressed Harcourt, asking; what should be the most 
fundamental political reforms for allowing a better chance at meaningful 
implementation? Another asked about the connection between women and 
economics. Harcourt responded to the last question first, arguing that we have to 
shift the way we understand gender relations economically. Feminist economists 
these days are counting the hours and trying to understand the values of women’s 
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work, but we need to start shifting the way we think of economics and to start 
valuing things differently, away from the old fashioned line focused on livelihoods 
and towards perspectives that consider, for example, care or community. She 
suggested that generational issues should be seen in the same light, re-examined in 
much more innovative ways that do not view ageing as something negative and 
young people as problematic, but both as times in life. Things can be valued beyond 
the problems.  
 On the subject of ageing, Simonen clarified that it is within the mandate of the 
UNFPA to help countries with ageing issues. She noted that there is an international 
consensus of action on ageing called the Madrid Plan. She also offered some details 
on the issues of funding and supported the idea of bringing in men into programmes 
as stakeholders. She wrapped up by returning to her main argument that both 
population policy and a rights-based approach to family planning need to ensure the 
availability of a wide choice of good quality and safe contraception, without side 
effects and responsive to the needs of users, including young people (boys and girls), 
and women and men.  
 
 
2.5. Session Five: China’s population dynamics and its impact on China’s 
Development  
 
The fifth lecture, given by Professor Xizhe Peng from Fudan University in Shanghai, 
was the first to offer an exclusively regional focus. It was greeted with very strong 
interest from the audience and many were particularly delighted by the candidness 
of Peng’s discussion of contemporary population debates in China. Indeed, in 
addition to being one of the leading demographers in China, another reason for 
inviting Peng to present on this theme, which was originally scheduled to be about 
the environment and livelihoods, was because of his role as the first demographer in 
China to conduct an extensive and rigorous study of the famine of the Great Leap 
Forward (1959-61) in the 1980s. In other words, Peng has been no stranger to 
controversial and politically-sensitive subjects in China.  
 To start with, Peng gave a brief introduction to China’s population and 
population policy today. By the end of last year, China’s population had reached 1.33 
billion, up from one billion in 1980. China is still the most populated country in the 
world. Every year there are about 16 million births and 9 million deaths, giving a 
natural increase of about 7 million annually, with some fluctuation over the years. 
Currently, 45 percent of people are classified as urban residents while 54 percent are 
rural residents, although this is subject to changing definitions of rural and urban. 
China’s population is also rapidly ageing. Currently, 20 percent of the population is 
under the age of fifteen, while the elderly (65+) constitute approximately 7.5 percent. 
Compared to the Netherlands, this population is still young, but its speed of ageing 
is much faster. In terms of spatial distribution, the overwhelming majority of the 
population is concentrated in coastal China, particularly in the Yangtze River Delta, 
the Pearl River Delta and in the Beijing and Tianjin regions.  
 Peng then explained the population dynamics of China over the last sixty 
years, illustrating the processes of demographic transition as discussed previously by 
Dyson and Cleland. In particular, he noted the high mortality and the fluctuation in 
birth and death rates during the great famine period between 1959 and 1961, the 
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causes of which are still a big topic of academic debate. When he did his research on 
this in 1984, he estimated that there were roughly 20 million excess deaths in those 
three years. After this, mortality fell sharply and life expectancy at birth has been 
continuously increasing, currently reaching 72 years, albeit with large regional 
differences between coastal and inland areas.  
 On the other hand, fertility remained high in the 1950s and 1960s. Regardless 
of whether urban or rural, the average Chinese family in the 1950s had about six 
children. There was a decline in fertility during the famine, and then a rapid decline 
in the urban areas over the 1960s. Higher fertility was maintained in the rural areas 
up to the early 1970s and then dropped rapidly over the 1970s, leading to a 
continuous decline in the birth rate in that decade. The birth rate fluctuated in the 
1980s and then has declined continuously over the last 20 years. The rapid reductions 
in fertility in the 1970s were related to the nation-wide family planning programme, 
which was implemented in the early 1970s. However, the urban fertility decline 
happened much earlier than these family planning programmes.  
 Currently, the official data on the total fertility rate in China ranges between 
1.7 and 1.8, i.e. below replacement, although, like with mortality, this rate is not 
homogeneous across the whole China. For example, the total fertility rate in 
Shanghai has been as low as 0.7 over the past 10 years, whereas in Tibet it remains at 
around 3.5 [note from the author: this rate for Tibet is out-of-date. The TFR in Tibet 
was actually below replacement in the 2000 census].12 In reality, the national rate 
might even be as low as 1.5, although the government and many scholars do not 
believe this. Debate is still going on about the exact rate, which is affecting the 
government’s decision whether or not it should change its population policy. 
 Although China’s family planning programme is usually called the ‘one-child 
policy’, Peng clarified that, in reality, China never actually implemented a pure one-
child policy. The current population policy was shaped in 1984 and the main 
principles have remained unchanged for the last 25 years. Generally speaking, we 
can divide the policy into different categories. The first is the one-child policy, which 
basically covers all urban residents, as well as rural couples in a few coastal 
provinces like Jiangsu. These are called the one-child policy areas, which covered 
about 36 percent of the total population of China in 2006. The majority of rural 
residents can have two children if the first one is a girl. For minority people, there is a 
general policy that allows them to have two or three children on average. Peng 
explained that there is a highly decentralized system of policy formation and 
implementation in China, which complicates matters even more, hence making the 
idea of a one-child policy oversimplified and misleading.  
 Estimating China’s future population depends on assumptions about future 
fertility. If total fertility remains at the official level of 1.8, China’s total population 
will continue to increase up to a peak of 1.47 billion in 2035, or an additional 120 
million more Chinese. If the population policy is relaxed and average fertility rises to 
two, the population will reach a peak of about 1.6 billion by 2050. However, if we 
assume that fertility rates are 1.5, then the Chinese population will peak at 1.4 billion 
by 2025. In all cases, the population starts to decline after the peak. If we assume a 
total fertility rate of 1.5, the total Chinese population will reach 75 million in 300 
years from now.   
 In addition to size and growth, Peng explained that the age structure of 
China’s population has changed very rapidly over the last half century as well. In the 
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1950s, China’s age structure was pyramid-like, very typical of a rapidly growing 
population (as Cleland described in the third lecture with regard to Korea in the 
1950s and Africa now). The Chinese population then became older and older, 
particularly once fertility started falling in the 1970s. In the 1970s, about 40 percent of 
Chinese were younger than fifteen years old, whereas now this proportion is less 
than 20 percent. On the other hand, the elderly population is rapidly increasing. 
Currently, there are more than 100 million elderly people (aged 65 and above). There 
are 160 million Chinese who are more than 60 years old, which is more than the total 
population of Japan (128 million in 2008). Peng noted that the elderly population is 
expected to increase to more than 350 million by 2050. By that time, India will have 
the largest population in the world, but China will have the largest elderly 
population in the world. In terms of share, the Chinese population is currently much 
younger than the US population, but it will become much older by 2035, given that 
the US has a fertility rate of 2.1 – the highest among all the OECD countries.  
 The spatial distribution of China’s population will also change rapidly. By the 
end of 2008, more than 600 million Chinese were classified as urban residents. The 
urbanisation rate was 36 percent of the total population in the 2000 census, although 
each year since then the urbanisation rate has increased by one percentage point, 
which is very rapid. Roughly speaking, about 13 million Chinese farmers become 
urban residents every year. However, Peng again cautioned that we have to be 
careful about the definition of urban and rural because much of it depends on 
administrative classifications, which often exclude temporary migrants. China’s 
urbanisation rate has probably been increasing even faster than the official data 
suggest if temporary migrants are included.  
 This rapid urban growth, Peng explained, has been in part caused by China’s 
rapid economic development, but also in part by the government’s development 
strategy to urbanize China, after years of purposefully restricting urbanisation. In 
addition, for many years the government also restricted the development of the 
biggest cities like Shanghai and Beijing, and encouraged the development of small or 
medium-sized cities, but this policy has been abandoned over the last 20 years. 
Instead, the government treats rapid urbanization as an efficient means of poverty 
alleviation. As a result, the big cities have become even bigger. For instance, the 
population of Shanghai was recently estimated to be about 20 million, including six 
million migrants. Some economists have suggested that Shanghai can accommodate 
50 million people, but Peng and other demographers and development specialists 
question how this would be possible to handle. He thought that it would be 
impossible to have sustainable development in such a context.  
 Also, with such rapid urbanization, the urban-rural gap has widened over the 
last thirty years, reinforcing the dual separation of the Chinese economy and society. 
Peng noted that the difference between urban and rural household incomes is 
currently around 3.1 to 1, meaning that urban residents earn over three times more 
than rural residents. If we include all the privileges and subsidies in housing, 
education, medical care and social welfare systems received by urban residents, the 
ratio between urban and rural income would be more than 4 to 1. This is becoming a 
big issue in China.    
 Migration is one means to correct this gap. Peng explained that rural to urban 
migrants currently number at least 140 million, although, again, this statistic must be 
treated with caution. Some estimate that it is about 200 million. Even with the 
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economic downturn, these migrants tend to remain in the urban and costal areas.  
The integration of these rural migrants into the urban mainstream society is 
becoming a big social issue in China. Migrants work in urban areas, but they do not 
enjoy the same social welfare, education, or other entitlements as urban residents. 
Hence, Chinese cities are divided.  
 Another major issue that Peng delved into was the sex ratio at birth, which has 
become a very serious problem in China. The sex ratio at birth was at a normal range 
before 1982, i.e. slightly more boys than girls at birth. Then it increased year after 
year, and now it is 120, meaning that for every 100 baby girls there are 120 baby boys. 
At first the government and scholars thought this was due to misreporting, but now 
we realise more and more that it is a real situation. According to projections, by 2025 
there will be 30 million more men than women in the population age group between 
24 and 40 years old. He suggested that a situation of 30 million young men who want 
wives but cannot find them could be a nightmare, leading to all sorts of social 
problems that are already starting to appear, such as the trafficking of wives.  
 China faces a certain dilemma of policy choices. Peng explained that, on one 
hand, fertility is already very low and there is very little room for further reduction. 
Yet the Chinese population continues to grow, which creates ever greater 
environmental pressure. In particular, if the sea levels rise in the future, this will 
impact most of the coastal cities where more and more Chinese are moving, as 
discussed above. It is clear that China is environmentally fragile, which is further 
rational for a rigid population policy. On the other hand, there is rapid population 
ageing. Slightly higher fertility would be required to slow down the ageing process, 
but this would make the total Chinese population grow even larger. So, do we 
tighten or loosen the rigid population policy?  
 There are two groups in this internal debate in China. One is the 
environmentalist group, which includes some government people and some 
economists who focus on the environmental impact of population growth, such as 
global warming and carbon emissions. They argue that, for the sake of the 
environment, China would be better to maintain a rigid population policy. Another 
group of people, in which Peng included himself, regard the rigid policy as unkind 
and that the government has already done enough. They argue that people should 
have a basic right to choose how many children they want and, accordingly, the 
policy should be relaxed. People in this group refer to rapid population ageing in 
support of their argument, particularly with regard to labour supply or the pension 
system. Indeed, only urban residents currently have government-sponsored 
pensions. The government has tried to establish a rural pension system since 2008, 
but it will still take a long time to establish an efficiently functioning pension system 
with good coverage, especially in the context of rapid population ageing. Peng noted 
that the debate is still ongoing in China and concluded that the government may 
create a modification to the current rigid one-child policy system in the urban and 
coastal areas while maintaining the two-child policy for China’s rural population.  
 
 The discussion was led with some brief comments by Professor Jeroen van 
Ginneken from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demography Institute in The 
Hague. He first offered a summary of the general meaning of the population factor, 
arguing that in general there should be a balance between the number of people 
served by social subsystems and the capacities of those subsystems. Situations may 
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arise where there is a shortage of people relative to the capacity of a subsystems, or 
else situations where there are too many people to be served by those subsystems. 
Both types of problems cause stresses and strains in the ability of a system to meet 
material and other needs. In his view, one of the tasks of demography is to assist in 
describing and quantifying these stresses and strains that are likely to operate in a 
subsystem as a result of population changes.  
 His second point was about the challenges faced by China as a result of 
population changes. In particular, he contemplated the implications of raising the 
living standards of 600 to 700 million Chinese rural dwellers. The meaning of this is 
hard to imagine in terms of food supply, water, gas, electricity and so on. Enormous 
efforts will be required to increase production within a very short time frame. China 
is working very hard to solve its pressing material needs of energy and water, 
including mega projects to be implemented on a scale never before witnessed 
anywhere else in the world. He gave the examples of large scale projects in wind and 
solar; efforts to acquire raw materials not only in China but also from many other 
countries in the world; and the ambitious schemes of diverting water from the south 
to the north of China, which has regional implications beyond China given that the 
rivers in question also supply India and Bangladesh. Van Ginneken noted that the 
negative consequences of rapid industrialization and economic growth in China 
must be considered alongside the negative consequences of population growth. He 
concluded that the sheer size of China makes these issues particularly important, 
with a potentially global impact.   
 
 As noted above, the subsequent discussion was animated and inspired by the 
frankness with which Peng elaborated on many points. For instance, there was much 
interest in the fact that the fertility rate in China had fallen prior to the official one-
child policy, which was a surprise for many in the audience. Peng explained that 
rapid fertility decline actually happened in the 1970s, from a total fertility rate of 5.8 
in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979, which was the most rapid decline to occur in China. In the 
1980s, the total fertility rate was actually fluctuating; it took almost ten years before it 
started to decline further despite the first implementation of the one child policy in 
1979. This was partly due to population momentum from the baby boomers of the 
1960s who were starting to have children in the 1980s. The one-child policy was 
made much more rigid in 1983, which is when many of the coercive practices 
happened, although the policy was not well accepted by rural people. He clarified 
that the coercive measures included disincentives and punishments, which were 
mostly applicable to middle class professional employees in government or other 
forms of formal urban employment. Therefore, the disincentives did not have much 
effect on the poor and/or rural, nor on rich people who could pay fines. So, a new 
directive was issued in 1984 to implement a one-child policy in urban areas and a 
two-child policy in rural areas, after which the coercive practices lessened.    
He explained further that there were two kinds of fertility transition in China. 
The first was in the 1970s and it did not involve any coercive measures. Instead, 
policy encouraged late marriage, late child bearing, long birth intervals, and having 
only a few healthy children (known as the later, longer, and fewer policy). This was 
supported by education and the provision of family planning contraception services. 
Hence, they achieved a slow down of population growth without much violation of 
basic reproductive rights. Peng did not mention the fact that this was in large part 
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possible because the society and economy were entirely collectivised at the time, 
allowing for a command system that supported these achievements. Some might 
argue that the lack of violation of basic reproductive rights, as well as progress in 
social and economic rights more generally, was achieved at the cost of broader civil 
and political rights. However, in the Maoist context of China at the time, this was a 
moot point.  
 Other questions were raised regarding the policy that a rural family could 
have two children if the first is a girl, which Peng mentioned in his presentation. 
Considerable concern regarding the gender implications of this was expressed. Peng 
agreed that this policy is definitely not good from a gender viewpoint. He had 
actually written an article on this, arguing that the son preference reflected through 
this policy institutionalises and legitimizes the gender inequality. However, he 
admitted that this is also current Chinese reality, especially in the rural areas, due to 
the marriage pattern whereby daughters marry out and daughter-in-laws marry in. 
Given the lack of government sponsored pensions in the rural areas, the parents still 
rely on their married sons to support them in their old age. Therefore, if there is no 
son in the family, it means the older parents will lose their old age security. So, the 
policy is a compromise between the ideology of equality and this Chinese reality. If 
the first child is a girl you can try another time. If you have a boy you solve the 
problem of old age security, but if both children are girls, you have to stop.  
Peng noted that the policy also encourages pre-birth sex selection through 
abortion if the second child is a girl. For instance, the sex ratio of first children is 
generally almost normal; the problem appears in the second or higher-order births. 
The sex ratio at birth for second children can be as high as 140, and as high as 200 for 
third children. The minimal condition of having at least one son seems to determine 
the desired family size in China.  
However, the sex selection problem is more generalised than simply this 
specific policy of allowing a second child if the first is a girl. Peng explained that it is 
more generally due to the easy availability of ultrasound machines, which are widely 
available through maternal care units and are now found in every Chinese village. 
As a result, it is relatively easy for parents to sex select if they desperately want a boy 
child in their family. Partially to compensate for this problem, the Chinese 
government launched a program called ‘care for the baby girls’, which includes 
various incentives to encourage having more girl children. Other countermeasures 
include efforts over the last five years to launched social security programmes for 
Chinese farmers. In response to another question regarding legislation on this 
problem, Peng also noted that the policy approach of the last ten years has aimed to 
give very harsh punishment to medical professionals involved in conducting the sex 
identification and abortion, such as being dismissed from medical practice forever. 
However, despite this approach, the problem still continues to increase. People even 
resort to the use of traditional Chinese doctors to identify sex.  
Peng agreed that these cultural ideologies are rooted in patriarchy, as 
suggested by Sathyamala, a medical doctor from India and a PhD student at ISS, 
although he also suggested that attitudes are changing. For instance, urban residents 
prefer girls to boys because, it is said, daughters provide much better care than sons. 
So it is quite different from India, in the sense that sex ratios are normal in the big 
coastal cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, where people treat boys and girls 
equally. In the western part of China, where family planning policy is relaxed, sex 
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ratios are also normal. The major problem is happening in the central part of China 
where the urbanization rate is low, economic development is low, and yet a strict 1.5 
child policy is still implemented, as in the coastal areas.  
 In response to another question by Sathyamala, he noted that the female 
suicide rate in rural China is much higher than in other parts of the world. Moreover, 
it is higher for women than for men, which is the opposite of most other countries. 
The rural suicide rate is also higher than the urban rate, again in contrast to most 
other countries. He and others are trying to study why female Chinese farmers have 
such high suicide rates, but he admitted that they do not yet have a concrete answer. 
However, he thought that health reform in China will definitely help to solve these 
kinds of problems, although such reforms still have a long way to go.   
Following a question by an ISS student from Shanghai, Peng also made some 
comments on the new generation of single children. Currently there are already 100 
million single children in China’s urban areas, i.e. seven percent of Chinese children 
are single children. He and others have been researching how these single children 
are reshaping China’s future society. They usually say that these single children are 
individualistic, self-centered, and have less family responsibility. On the other hand, 
in 2008 we saw many of these single children volunteering in the Sichuan earthquake 
relief effort. So, what will happen when they get power? Peng thought that the future 
implications are huge. He joked that maybe China will become democratic when this 
generation reaches their 30s or 40s because they do not believe in any authority, 
hence they will have to vote to solve their quarrels and disputes.  
 Amidst various questions on economics, migration and livelihoods, Peng 
explained that China’s labour force will peak in 2016 at around one billion. China’s 
labour force will then decline. He suggested that there are two options to solve the 
problem. One is that China has to adapt by restructuring its economy and gradually 
shifting away from labour intensive exports and towards capital or knowledge 
intensive sectors. The second option is to delay the retirement age, which harkened 
back to some of the discussion following Cleland’s lecture in the third session. He 
noted that some of these various policy options might be good, but they need to be 
implemented at the right time.   
 Andrew Fischer (the current author), questioned whether loosening the family 
planning policy would lead to a rise in fertility, particularly in light of the fact that 
very proactive efforts in Europe and Canada to raise fertility rates have been largely 
futile, as noted by Paul Demeny, among others. He wondered whether there is any 
indication that relaxing control in China would actually change the fertility trends. 
Peng explained that this is precisely another debate among scholars in China. The 
government worries that fertility would rebound if controls are loosened, although 
we have lots of evidence from other East Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, that once fertility reaches such a low level, it is 
impossible to make women have two children. One Japanese sociologist suggested 
that this is the revenge of Japanese women to the male dominated patriarchal society 
in Japan. Peng and other scholars in China have been arguing along these lines, that 
there is no need to worry about loosening the policy. Indeed, he noted that in 
Shanghai, the fertility rate has been around 0.7 for the last ten years, whereas the rate 
that policy would allow, given the structure and characteristics of the population, is 
1.1. In other words, even though the population policy is very rigid there, people still 
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have lower fertility than allowed by that policy. The problem in the future will be 
about how to ask couples to have more children, not less.  
 
 
2.6. Session Six: Population Growth – is it still an issue? 
 
The last lecture was crowned by the presence of Steven Sinding, who, like Cleland 
and Dyson, is one of the eminent international figures in the field of population and 
development. His role was to sum up the series by asking the question; is rapid 
population growth still an important global issue? If so, what interventions and 
approaches are compatible with today’s development thinking? He especially liked 
the second part of this question because, he explained, so much of the debate 
continues to be about yesterday’s development thinking.  
 Like other speakers, Sinding first went over some historical background. He 
reflected that the world is very different today than it was in 1973, when Robert 
McNamara, the President of the World Bank, called population growth the second 
most pressing and complex problem facing mankind, only surpassed by the threat of 
thermonuclear war. No one in such a position would utter those words today. Yet 
McNamara was reflecting the liberal development consensus of that time, upon 
which a very large cooperative effort among industrialized counties was undertaken 
to export a commitment to reducing high fertility rates throughout the developing 
world, primarily through family planning programmes.  
Most development economists of that era, which lasted from the 1950s until 
the mid 1980s, concurred with the view that rapid population growth represented a 
serious barrier to economic growth. This view had its origin, Sinding thought, in the 
writings of Reverend Malthus over a century and half earlier, but its modern 
manifestation was most famously expressed in the 1958 book by Ansley Coale and 
Edgar Hoover, entitled Population Growth and Economic development in Low Income 
Countries. They argued that rapid population growth was the primary cause of the 
chronic poverty and the low economic growth rates of low income countries, and 
that strenuous efforts to lower fertility rates were a precondition for economic 
development.  
This view quickly gained favour among much of the political leadership in the 
West as well as political elites in many parts of the developing world, particularly in 
Asia. The population crisis consensus, as Sinding suggested it might be called, was 
not restricted to concerns about economic development; issues of international 
stability and national security were also evoked. As today, there were concerns about 
population pressure giving rise to unmanageable international migration, threats to 
various natural systems, food security and the environment.  
The consensus was not shared by countries of the Soviet bloc or by socialist 
developing countries. Indeed throughout the 1960s and 1970s it was impossible to 
achieve consensus within the United Nations on the priorities that population 
policies and programmes should receive. Yet a major industry was established in 
1950s and continued through the 1960s. It was comprised initially of The Population 
Council think tank and international NGOs like the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation. Then bilateral development agencies joined, led by the 
Swedish International Development Agency and USAID, and eventually the 
multilaterals such as UNFPA and the World Bank. This industry spent hundreds of 
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millions of dollars annually to promote population policies and to support family 
planning programmes throughout the developing world. The Netherlands was part 
of that consensus although not among the original leaders of the advocacy effort. 
International population conferences were convened, from Teheran in the 1950s, to 
Rome in the 1960s, to a series of three UN-sponsored global political meetings 
running from Bucharest through Mexico City to Cairo. In the decade between the 
Bucharest conference in 1974 and the Mexico City conference in 1984, Sinding 
thought that something like a consensus emerged regarding an urgent perception of 
the population problem on a worldwide basis and the appropriateness of family 
planning programmes to address it.  
However, he argued that the global population crisis consensus started to 
disintegrate in the mid 1980s as a result of two major interrelated factors. First, the 
Reagan administration reversed decades-old US policy and declared in 1984 at the 
Mexico City International Conference on population that population growth was no 
longer to be considered a negative factor in development. This signalled a serious 
downgrading of the priority given to population programme assistance, especially 
considering that the US had been the principal driver and funder of the population 
crisis consensus up to that time. Second, by the mid to late 1980s, we started to see 
significant declines in population growth rates in every major region of the world 
except Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as fertility rates approaching replacement levels 
in many of the countries that had mounted aggressive population policies, such as 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Tunisia, Colombia and Mexico. Others that started their 
programmes somewhat later were also showing major fertility decline, such as 
Bangladesh, Egypt, China, Morocco, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Iran and Vietnam.  
Hence, many people started to feel that the crisis had passed. Fertility decline 
over the second half of the 20th century was clearly enough established throughout 
most cases in Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America, whether primarily 
due to strong policies and programmes or to more natural responses of improving 
living standards. Crisis no longer seemed to be the right framework to think about 
population issues but, at the same time, the Cairo Conference was approaching. It is 
no wonder that, in the ensuing political struggle between demographers and 
reproductive rights advocates at Cairo, the latter emerged victorious. The 
demographers simply had a less compelling case to convince political leaders that 
the trade offs between strong population control and reproductive rights were still 
required.  
The years since Cairo have been very difficult for the worldwide population 
movement. Sinding clarified that he used this term cautiously because, although a 
version of that movement still exists, it can no longer be called by that name. The 
famous paradigm shift of Cairo thoroughly changed the rules of the game as well as 
the shape of the arena. We are now compelled to refer to the movement in terms of 
sexual and reproductive health and rights. What had been an international 
movement to promote a particular set of policies and programmes to reduce 
population growth became, after 1994, a movement to promote sexual and 
reproductive health and rights as an end in itself. Without passing judgement on this, 
Sinding saw the change as the natural consequence of a series of changes in the 
global environment, some of them political, some demographic, others social and 
cultural. However, he did argue that the virtual disappearance of the demographic 
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rational took with it the very strong sense of urgency and even imperative to action 
that the population crisis mentality inspired.  
Sinding also recognized that the change which occurred in Cairo resulted in 
much lower priority for reproductive and sexual health programmes than the more 
narrowly-defined family planning predecessors had enjoyed. Since 1995, funding for 
population activities as defined in the Cairo programme of action has fallen 
considerably. Funding for family planning has fallen by some 30 percent, according 
to Sinding’s estimates. Several extra reasons for this include: first, changing priorities 
in the health sector including the HIV/AIDS pandemic; second, the failure to include 
any reference to the Cairo goals in the MDGs; third, the changing architectures of 
international development cooperation with its strong emphasis on budget and 
sector support and country ownership; and finally, confusion and, to some degree, 
controversy surrounding the term sexual and reproductive health and rights. As a 
consequence of these multiple and somewhat interrelated factors, the simple truth is 
that in many countries today individuals and women in particular have less help and 
less power to exercise or control their own reproduction and reproductive health 
than they did a decade ago. In other words, the decline in funding, Sinding claimed, 
is making a mockery of the Cairo commitment to universal access to reproductive 
health. He argued that this retreat is highly regrettable, for both macro and 
individual and family welfare concerns.  
Returning to the question of the lecture, he clarified his position on rapid 
population growth, meaning rates of natural population increase over 2 percent per 
year and fertility rates over 3 children per women. According to his opinion, 
countries experiencing rapid population growth would be better off if growth rates 
would be moderated. Individuals, particularly poor people, who have high fertility 
as a result of unplanned or unintended pregnancies would also be better off if their 
fertility would be lower. Generally speaking, countries with rates of natural increase 
over two percent have considerable difficulty keeping pace with the demand for jobs, 
the need to build class rooms and train teachers, the need for health facilities, the 
ability to produce sufficient food to meet domestic calorie and nutritionals 
requirements, and the ability to invest resources in ways that promote economic 
growth. He also referred to the demographic bonus, when falling fertility rates raise 
the proportion of working aged people in the population to a one-off historical high, 
as discussed in previous lectures. He noted that this is a potential, and that if 
countries invest wisely and appropriately as did the Asian tigers during the 1960s 
and 1970s, they can take advantage of this one-time bonus to bring themselves up to 
considerably higher levels of productivity and growth. On the other hand, he was 
not aware of any country experiencing rapid population growth, as he defined it, 
that has also enjoyed rapid and sustained economic growth, except a handful of oil 
exporting states. In other words, Sinding argued that reducing fertility is by no 
means a sufficient condition for economic growth, but it may be a necessary one. 
There was not always academic consensus on the relationship between 
population growth and economic development, he admitted, and there may not even 
be one today, although recent research supports his position and is well accepted by 
development economists. There is also increasing agreement that high rates of 
population growth can have significantly negative consequences for the 
environment, such as fresh water supplies, deforestation, soil erosion and depletion, 
biological diversity and species extinction, air and water pollution. Other things 
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equal, he argued that rapid population growth clearly makes it harder for countries 
to protect and preserve their natural environment and habitats. Other potential 
impacts at the societal level include civil unrest and disruption. A rapidly growing 
population of poorly fed, poorly educated and unemployed young people, especially 
young men, is a recipe for civil disorder born out of frustration and despair, he 
argued. Such young people are natural and willing recruits to radical political 
movements, as suggested by the experience of the high fertility regions of the Middle 
East and much of East, Central and West Africa. He thought that it is naïve to think 
that high fertility and youthful age structure have nothing to do with political 
violence and social upheaval.  
He nonetheless steered clear from Malthusian thinking on this matter, i.e. the 
idea that high fertility is a natural response to poverty. As discussed in the first 
session with Dyson and Garenne, it is now known that a great deal of child bearing 
by poor people, especially women, is unintended and unwanted, and that poor 
families that successfully reduce fertility also do considerably better economically on 
average than families that do not. In other words, looking at the impact of fertility on 
poverty, rather than the impact of poverty on fertility, leads to quite different 
conclusions. This is important for poverty reduction, which he noted is at the heart of 
the MDGs. High fertility makes it harder for families to send all their children to 
school, to get them immunized, or to properly care for them when they are sick and 
in need of medicine. A child born into a family of three or more children, especially if 
the birth comes within less than 24 months after the last child was born, is much 
more likely to die before the age of five than a child born to a smaller family, three or 
more years after the last one. In other words, the number and spacing of children is 
critical to child survival. Fewer the births also lower the chances of pre-mature death; 
a mother who delays childbearing until her late twenties and who stops before her 
forties is far more likely to survive to old age than a mother who starts sooner or 
ends later. Women who marry latter, delay child bearing, and have fewer children 
are also far more likely to find work outside the home, to get a decent education, and 
to participate on more equal terms in family decision-making. And, he claimed that 
no other factor is more important than female education when it comes to reducing 
fertility (although, interestingly, this point was qualified in the first session by both 
Dyson and Garenne). Female education and fertility reduction, he suggested, may be 
the best example of mutually-reinforcing outcomes in the entire literature of 
development. 
In conclusion, Sinding made the case that, no matter how you look at it, it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that lower fertility helps to reduce poverty and 
contributes to the achievement of every Millennium Development Goal. He did not 
think that reducing rapid population growth and high fertility are panaceas; there 
are few short cuts and no easy answers in development. However, he firmly believed 
that in places where population is growing very rapidly and where fertility is 
especially high, it would be far easier to improve living standards and to stimulate 
environmentally sustainable and sustained economic growth if we could at least 
satisfy the unmet need for contraception and the other simple and relatively 
inexpensive services that comprise reproductive health. We know how to do this and 
we have shown in many countries around the world how relatively simple and 
inexpensive high quality reproductive health can be. Simply by restoring 
reproductive health to a position of high priority within our efforts to expand basic 
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health services and strengthening primary care systems, we can make giant strides to 
realize the MDGs and our collective dream of a world free of extreme poverty.  
 
On that galvanising note, Bert Koenders, the discussant, took the audience 
back to Malthus, who he claimed was the elephant in the room. He then fast 
forwarded to 1972, when technology in agriculture and in birth control had 
developed to a point that Malthus could not have foreseen. However, the Club of 
Rome, a think tank of scientists from various disciplines, nonetheless published the 
famous Limits to Growth, a landmark publication which concluded that economic 
growth could not continue indefinitely because of the limited availability of natural 
resources, particularly oil. He skipped again to the present, on the eve of the UN 
advocacy conference in Copenhagen on global warming and global environmental 
change. He contextualised the issues surrounding the Copenhagen summit, noting 
that the world’s richest half billion people, or 7 percent of the world population, 
account for 50 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, while the poorest 50 percent are 
responsible for just 7 percent of the emissions. Indeed, this was a very refreshing 
perspective to bring the audience back to the much broader context shaping world 
poverty today, in contrast to the narrow albeit important focus on fertility and 
poverty provided by Sinding.  
World population in 2050 will nonetheless range from 7.9 to 10.4 billion, 
depending on different scenarios. Together with Western patterns of consumption, 
Koenders suggested that this is a major reason why it will become increasingly 
difficult to achieve sustainable development for all. Moreover, the time from now 
until 2050 is critical. After 2050, the consequences of low fertility might make life 
easier, but not before. He then questioned what this means for economic growth, 
development and the poor, noting that the debate touches on many issues including 
ethics and equity. Simple population control is neither a solution nor feasible, he 
argued, because the question is much broader, dealing with the balance between 
development versus the right to live in a healthy and safe environment, and between 
the rights of future generations versus what is important for politicians. How do we 
make this intergenerational and interplanetary relationship politically relevant in the 
consumer society we live in?  
He argued that climate change is far more sensitive to consumption patterns 
than to demographic considerations and that the distributive equity question should 
be at the core of the debate. Scarcity and growth are essentially social phenomena, he 
contended, which is a crucial link missing in population and environment debates. 
Moreover, he noted that the move to replacement-level fertility has already been 
dramatic in many cases around the world. So, while population growth is now 
starting to receive a little more attention in Copenhagen and by magazines such as 
The Economist, he thought that those of us with a more balanced approach need to 
take a stand, particularly with regard to correctly apportioning the blame for 
consumption levels in the developed countries. He detailed the various ways he 
would do this including by adding the issue of demographic development to the 
mandate of the Ambassador for Sustainable Development and also provided a 
variety of reflections on many of the themes covered in the lecture series.  
Perhaps as a critical reflection, Koenders also noted that Sinding and others 
were preaching in a very sophisticated way to the converted because he and many 
others share their sense of urgency. For instance, here in the Netherlands, the 
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advisory counsel on international affairs recently published a report on demographic 
change in development cooperation, focusing especially on the balance between 
different age groups in a society and the demographic dividend. Koenders argued 
that in order to fully benefit from this temporary phenomenon, economic growth and 
good governance are important conditions. Turning to the youth bulge into a true 
demographic dividend requires investments in health, education, vocational 
training, and in stimulating the private sector and creating jobs. Indeed, the youth 
bulge is a phenomenon faced almost in all post-conflict aid interventions. Similarly, 
he argued that ageing might solve some problems but cause many others, such as 
pensions. Meanwhile, HIV/AIDS in Africa has eliminated a whole group of parents 
and professionals, leaving the very young and the very old exposed and vulnerable. 
These issues require a broadening vision and that equity is taken as a firm starting 
point.  
Koenders suggested that population policy is no longer a hotly debated issue 
in The Netherlands because of the specific Dutch approach to sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. The Dutch experience shows how access to 
reproductive health information, services and commodities works better than a 
quantitative population policy. We have been called the champion of the rights-
based approach, although he thought this was a bit exaggerated given all the work 
that has been done around the world. However, he reminded the audience that it 
nonetheless took intense debate and long battles over the last hundred years to reach 
this situation in The Netherlands today. For instance, The Netherlands has often been 
attacked for the wide availability of abortion, although Koenders had evidence that 
abortion is not used as a family planning tool and the country’s abortion rate is very 
low compared to other countries. The Dutch approach has been based on an 
understanding that banning does not reduce the number of abortions, but that it does 
affect the conditions under which women have abortions.   
Sexual and reproductive health and rights are touchy subjects, Koenders 
reflected, given that they relate to very personal decisions on family relationships 
and sexuality. But he insisted that he is prepared to defend the Dutch policy at any 
time, and he was also convinced that these sensitive issues have to be raised by 
politicians in international circles given that they are crucial for the achievement of 
the MDGs. In his view, MDG Five (the reduction of maternal mortality) is the mother 
of all MDGs. However, the case for sexual and reproductive health and rights has to 
be made over and over again and it is seriously lagging behind. He questioned why 
this is and made a strong appeal to change the situation given that we know what to 
do, if only we would invest in it. He also argued for recognizing the key role of 
young people in this debate and that they should have access to sexual and 
reproductive health information, education, services and commodities, as a universal 
right, with no exception. In particular, the unmet need for contraception must be 
addressed, he argued, alongside the right for education, for the reasons explained 
several times in this lecture series.  
There are success stories. He highlighted Bangladesh’s success in fertility 
decline, which is interesting for a number of reasons. It is debated whether the 
decline is attributable to reduced poverty and increased women empowerment, or to 
family planning in the country, although both seem to have played a role. Similar 
results are starting to happen in Pakistan. Generally, family planning in Asia seems 
to have been an important factor in such successes and the Dutch government is 
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aiming to boost investment in family planning, which has fallen dramatically in 
recent decades. Koenders then explained how the government is planning to do this 
within a liberal perspective of respect for individual rights. Koenders concluded by 
suggesting that three measures are required; family planning needs to be prioritised, 
adolescence needs to become a priority, and health systems need to be strengthened, 
with sexual and reproductive health as a priority. He called on everybody to work 
towards population policies that are founded on human rights and that look at 
population from a rights-based point of view, not in terms of vague ideology but in 
terms of things that can be practically implemented, particularly with regard to the 
unmet need of so many women for contraception.  
 
The questions in this session tended to focus on two themes. One regarded 
Sinding’s arguments on funding and support for family planning since Cairo, and 
the other regarded questions of sustainability, growth and poverty, and their relation 
to fertility and family planning. In response, both speakers reiterated many of the 
points from their presentations, Sinding on the achievements but also continuing 
need for family planning, and Koenders on the challenges of sustainable 
development and the need for international negotiations. Koenders also encouraged 
the trend of private sector involvement in the sustainability movement. In the second 
round of questions, he also supported the idea that, in a very general sense, higher 
levels of economic growth bring a decline in fertility rates. This does not mean that 
fertility cannot be brought down or education improved in the absence of growth, 
but that growth definitely helps. He thought that growth played a role in the success 
of Bangladesh (although this response ignored a question specifically regarding the 
fact that poverty rates had not fallen in Bangladesh). He also supported the idea that 
education is enormously important, particularly girls’ education.  Finally, he clarified 
that he was not arguing that there are too many people in the world, but that the 
present level of population growth at present levels of consumption, production and 
unequal distribution is unsustainable.   
Similarly, Sinding clarified that he is very careful not to say that reducing 
population growth is the way to economic development, but that he feels equally 
strongly that countries which succeed in reducing rapid rates of population growth 
stand a better chance of achieving sustained economic growth than those which do 
not. He also thinks that there is virtuous circular relationship between the two, in the 
sense that fertility tends to decline in countries that grow more prosperous and 
declining fertility also improves opportunities for economic growth (albeit, Sinding 
did not qualify that the inverse of this logic leads to Malthusianism,, i.e. the idea that 
poverty drives high fertility). He suggested that it almost does not matter when one 
intervenes in this cycle; once the process begins, it tends to sustain itself.  
In response to certain questions on the backtracking on women’s rights, 
Sinding agreed but also noted that this backlash is a consequence of enormous 
progress. It is a symptom of success rather than a cause for alarm. Sinding thought 
that the international women’s movement is unstoppable and will continue to make 
progress in the years going forward.  
Regarding Cairo, Sinding argued that it has taken almost two decades to bring 
the two sides (demographers and SRHR advocates) together to a point where we can 
talk about our mutual interest as opposed to our mutual hostility. We have reached 
the point in which a rights-based approach is seen as absolutely the right way to go 
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and, at the same time, it is considered alright to talk about population issues again, 
when they are real and meaningful. The latter was not possible in Cairo. We are in a 
much better place than 20 years ago with respect to that particular battle. He argued 
that Cairo was nonetheless important for establishing a much higher moral ground 
and ethical basis for population programmes, but this came with a price.   
With regard to fertility change, Sinding clarified that he was trying to argue 
that, when given the choice between having five children or ten children, or the 
choice between having a child every year or every two or three years, women tend to 
choose the former, even in the context of a subsistence rural economy. Hence, the 
argument that poor people need more children completely overlooks the fact that 
many women in these circumstances are desperate not to have so many children so 
close together. So, with family planning programmes, people are starting to have five 
children instead of eight. Sinding pointed out that this is precisely the beginning of 
demographic transition. With urbanization, children then start to become much more 
costly, reinforcing the transition. This appears to happen regardless of whether or not 
poverty improves, as demonstrated by the case of Bangladesh.   
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3. Conclusion: New Consensuses and Ways Forward 
 
Whether intended or not, the sum of the six lectures offered a fascinating 
retrospective, often self-reflective, on the evolution of thinking about population and 
development since Cairo, if not since the end of the Second World War. Major points 
of tension and contention were revisited, particularly by Cleland, Simonen, Harcourt 
and Sinding. Positions were taken and yet, somehow, a sense of consensus transpired 
across the lectures besides some notable differences.  
 
Without detailing all of the points and arguments summarised in this report, it is 
roughly accurate to say that the consensus formed around an understanding that 
past debates were in large part based on the tension between choice and control as 
two mutually-exclusive means of implementing family planning programmes. In 
contrast, now there is a common understanding that rights-based means of choice are 
not necessarily in tension with the ends of population control. This latter meaning of 
control does not refer to the sense used by Harris, i.e. governments coercively 
controlling the movement and/or behaviour of populations. Rather, it refers, in a 
broad macro sense, of deciphering the complex ways in which the growth of the 
world's population might be kept within limits that are deemed sustainable. The new 
consensus in the field of population and development, as represented by these 
lectures, suggests that free choice and protection of rights might indeed be the best 
way to achieve this desired end, by inducing a broad macro-structural 'paradigm' 
shift towards greater contraception use, lower fertility and smaller families, albeit 
with the qualification that this is based on the wide scale universalistic provisioning 
of family planning of other social services.  
 
This latter consensus was evident in all of the lectures besides that of Harris, despite 
otherwise often contrasting postures in the so called demography-versus-rights 
debate. For instance, Dyson and Garenne, both demographers, repeatedly asserted 
that fertility decline is, to a large extent, driven by structural processes and that the 
best way to facilitate these processes is by offering choice of safe, effective and 
affordable contraception. As argued by Dyson, contraception provides people with 
choice and all the evidence shows that given the possibility of making this choice, 
eventually men and women (even poor and illiterate men and women) always 
decide to take it and reduce (or at least regulate) their fertility. Hence, the means 
harmonise with the ends, provided that these are supported by an underlying 
condition of sustained reductions in mortality.  
 
Similarly, despite his own reservations with the rights-based agenda, Cleland made 
many similar points, albeit with the qualification that demography should set the 
agenda while rights should only guide the means. Peng also pointed out, to the 
surprise of many, that China's fastest period of fertility decline was not under the 
coercive one-child policy, but a decade earlier, through more voluntary programmes 
of family planning. Sinding discussed the effect of fertility on poverty and explicitly 
evoked this new consensus, recognising the role of rights albeit embedded within a 
reinvigorated return of family planning programmes. He argued that trying to 
satisfy the unmet need for contraception and the other simple and relatively 
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inexpensive services that comprise reproductive health would be more than 
sufficient to support a virtuous cycle of declining fertility. Simonen more or less 
supported Sinding's position from a gender perspective, with particular emphasis on 
the negative impacts of unmet need for contraception. Although Harcourt was 
suspicious of arguments for population control, this was not because of her 
disagreement on issues of demography, but rather, because of political economy and 
distributive justice concerns. Many of speakers agreed with the general gist of her 
criticisms, including as Dyson, Garenne, Cleland and Koenders.  
 
This consensus might appear to support a fairly liberal perspective on society, i.e. 
that rights protecting freedom of choice and behaviour, within the limits of law, are 
the most effective way of achieving a rational equilibrium and efficiency. However, 
such a liberal perspective is limited in the sense that the consensus is also implicitly 
predicated on the crucial role of strong provisioning of public goods by states, 
particularly in health care, education and other social services. Indeed, many of the 
factors that help societies to manage and adapt to the huge disequilibria caused by 
demographic transition include state welfare and planning. For instance, we cannot 
understand China's success in reducing fertility through more voluntary forms of 
family planning in the 1970s without understanding the entirely state-collectivised 
context at the time, as well as the near universalistic provisioning of primary health 
care and basic education in both rural and urban areas, at least to a level that allowed 
for the rapid dissemination of new practices and socially-transformative messages. 
As discussed by both Cleland and Peng, even in those countries that are now very 
advanced in the demographic transition (i.e. Europe), strong state support for 
women's reproductive and productive labour has been crucial in efforts to keep 
fertility rates close to replacement levels (in those countries that have managed to do 
this). Similarly, in those countries in the middle stages of the transition, such as most 
of Asia and Latin America, successful tapping of the so-called 'demographic bonus' 
requires employment-focused development strategies. The countries that have been 
most successful at this, such as South Korea or Taiwan, have generally had fairly 
illiberal development policies, supported by large amounts of aid, strong bouts of 
redistribution, and fairly universalistic social policy regimes, despite being 
considerably poor in the earlier stages of their transitions. This is quite contrary to 
the standard neoliberal 'Washington Consensus' policies that have reigned in 
mainstream development institutions such as the World Bank over the last 30 years.  
 
In other words, while the contemporary consensus in demography and population 
policy might appear as fairly liberal, insofar as it pertains to matters of choice at the 
individual or family level about whether or how to use contraception and to 
reproduce, the interaction of this with wider political economy perspectives offers a 
more complex and subtle picture of the development of populations within their 
societies and economies, at local, national and global levels. This picture would seem 
to invoke the need for a definite shift back to strong forms of developmentalism in 
the Global South and universalistic and equalising welfare interventions in the 
Global North if we are to have any hope of both equitable and sustainable 
development in the future. Hopefully, the lecture series and this report have 
provided one scientifically-informed step in that direction. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 I am indebted to the excellent research assistance of Selamawit Abebe Kelbisow and also for the 
editorial and logistical support of Gordana Stankovi  in the writing of this report.  
2 The Institute of Social Studies (ISS; www.iss.nl) in The Hague is one of the foremost centres of 
teaching and research in development studies in Europe and the world. Established in 1952, it brings 
together students and teachers from the Global South and the North in a European environment, 
carrying out research, teaching and public service in the field of development studies and 
international cooperation. In July 2009, ISS integrated with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam but 
remained in the Hague as an autonomous university institute.  
3 Society for International Development, Netherlands’ Chapter (SID NL; www.sid-nl.org) is one of 
the 45 local and national chapters of SID International, which is an international non-governmental 
association of individuals and organisation founded in 1957 to promote social justice and foster 
democratic participation (see www.sidint.org). SID NL is an independent platform organisation that 
aims to contribute to a sustainable and peaceful world through stimulating, renewing and broadening 
debates on the international cooperation in the Netherlands, thereby subsequently influencing policy 
discussions. The philosophy of SID NL is that development and social change can only occur if 
multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder and multi-track approach is applied. SID NL is one of a few 
organisations in the Netherlands which applies this approach by creating strategic partnerships with 
other relevant initiatives and organisations. Over last 20 years, SID NL has organized the most 
prestigious annual series of public lectures about development issues in the Netherlands, attracting 
top international speakers and audiences comprising the Dutch development intellectual elite. 
4 World Population Foundation (WPF; www.wpf.org) is the only Dutch NGO that focuses exclusively 
on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) in developing countries. It has a 20-year track 
record of successful advocacy – pushing the Netherlands to become a leader in this field – and a 
programme of interventions in Africa and Asia. Its main speciality is sexuality education, building on 
the experience and credibility of the Netherlands in SRHR matters. It has developed effective 
cooperation with major Dutch development NGO’s. Through its MYBODY label (with slogan: My 
Life, My Choice, My Body), it enhances the awareness of Dutch society in general for the importance 
of SRHR worldwide. An explicit part of its mission is to explain the intricate relationship between 
population issues and SRHR. 
5 Students attending came from ISS, Wageningen and other universities. Academic staff attended from 
ISS, Universities of Amsterdam, Groningen, Wageningen, and Erasmus Rotterdam, and the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. Attendance from research institutes included Clingendael Institute, 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the Environmental Security Institute.  
6 Policy makers and civil servants attending were mainly from different departments in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affaires, but also from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affaires. Embassies 
represented included Chile, Hungary, Iraq, Morocco, Norway, Palestine, Romania, and Republic of 
Sudan. International organisations represented included the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) and the European Patent Office. NGOs represented included Save the Children, Stop Aids 
Now, Oxfam-Novib, Netherlands Red Cross, and obviously SID and WPF. Businesses represented 
included Shell International and the association of Dutch Water Companies.  
7 The first article appeared on 9 May 2009 after the first lecture by Tim Dyson in the NRC 
Handelsblad, written by Dirk Vlasboom and based on an interview with Tim Dyson; ‘Voorbij grote bij 
sterven’. A rebuttal was written by Richard Paping from Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. The second 
article also appeared in the NRC Handelsblad on 19 November after the last lecture Steve Sinding and 
Bert Koenders, written by Mark Schenkel, ‘Rem bevolkingsgroei Afrika af, anders gaat het mis’ (‘Slow 
down population growth, otherwise disaster looms’). 
8 Wetenschappelijke Raad Foor Het Regeringsbeleid (WRR). Minder pretentie, meer ambitie: 
ontwikkelingschulp die verschil maakt (Less pretension, more ambition: development aid that makes a 
difference). Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010. See 
http://www.wrr.nl/dsc?c=getobject&s=obj&!M9xXGAuyBPegM35UuYCWRV1DyOvsfxaqys3h54uV
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NGO that focuses exclusively on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights 
(SRHR) in developing countries. It has a 20-year track record of succes-
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the field of development studies and international cooperation. In July 
2009, ISS integrated with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam but 
remained in the Hague as an autonomous university institute.
